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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essays, entitled “The
Effect of Insurance on Emergency Room Visits: An Analysis of the 2006
Massachusetts Health Reform,” analyzes the impact of a major health reform
in Massachusetts on emergency room (ER) visits. I exploit the variation
in pre-reform uninsurance rates across counties to identify the causal effect
of the reform on ER visits. My estimates imply that the reform reduced
ER usage by between 5 and 13 percent, nearly all of which is accounted
for by a reduction in non-urgent visits that could be treated in alternative
settings. The reduction in non-urgent and primary-care treatable visits is
most pronounced during regular office hours when physician’s offices are likely
to be open. In contrast, I find no effect for non-preventable emergencies such
as heart attacks. These estimates are consistent with a large causal effect of
insurance on ER usage and imply that expanding insurance coverage could
have a substantial impact on the efficiency of health services.
The second essay, entitled “The Impact of Health Care Reform on Personal
Bankruptcy,” studies the same reform to analyze the effect of insurance on
personal bankruptcy. I find that the reform reduced personal bankruptcy
rates, with the most pronounced declines occurring in the most affected
counties. The magnitude of the estimated effect increases with exposure
to the reform: a one percentage point decrease in pre-reform insurance rate
decreases the personal bankruptcy rate by 0.03 bankruptcies per 1000 resi-
dents. This reduction is driven by Chapter 7 bankruptcies that tend to be
filed by low-income debtors. In contrast, I do not find significant improve-
ments in other measures of economic activity, such as the unemployment rate
or the business bankruptcy rate.
The final chapter, “Information and Default in Consumer Credit Markets:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” looks at the role of information in
consumer credit markets. Despite the prominent role that information plays
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in the economic theory of credit markets, no direct evidence exists on the
causal relationship between the availability of information about loan ap-
plicants and loan performance. This chapter provides such evidence by ex-
ploiting an unanticipated change in the amount of information visible in an
online market for loans to measure the impact of lender information on loan
outcomes. Conditional on data available in both periods, allowing lenders to
access more borrower credit information reduced default rates by 10 percent-
age points on average. These gains were most pronounced for high risk loans.
Recovery rates on defaulted loans improved. Immediate lender returns in-
creased by about 12 percentage points and took 6 weeks to decay, providing
a measure of the time it took for the market to assimilate the content of the
new information. I test whether these results are driven by lender screening
or selection among loan applicants using data that is unobserved by lenders
in both periods. I find that there is no change in unobserved credit quality
among loan applicants, indicating that the improvement in default rates is
primarily a result of better lender screening.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The primary domestic role of the United States federal and state govern-
ments is to provide insurance to its citizens. In some instances, this in-
surance is provided directly. For example, the federal government provides
health insurance to most citizens over 65 years of age through the Medicare
program. In other cases, private organizations are mandated to provide in-
surance. For example, the 1986 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act compels hospitals to provide care to patients with medical emer-
gencies regardless of their ability to pay. Other types of insurance are less
obvious: the bankruptcy system, for example, provides a type of insurance
that protects a debtor from losing all of his property to his creditors if he falls
on hard times. The goal of this dissertation is to show how these different
types of insurance programs interact and how they influence the behavior of
those they cover.
The first essay, “The Effect of Insurance on Emergency Room Visits: An
Analysis of the 2006 Massachusetts Health Reform,” examines how an expan-
sion of insurance coverage through a health reform in Massachusetts affected
emergency room (ER) usage in the state. The 1986 Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act mandates that hospital emergency rooms
treat the uninsured even if it is clear they cannot pay for the services. The
uninsured may therefore choose to seek care in the ER rather than a pri-
vate physician’s office even for non-urgent conditions because they cannot be
denied medical treatment. I find that the expansion of insurance coverage
to the uninsured in Massachusetts reduced reliance on hospital emergency
rooms for non-urgent care. By expanding one type of insurance - health in-
surance to the uninsured - Massachusetts reduced reliance on a different type
of public insurance - mandated hospital charity care.
The second essay, “The Impact of Health Reform on Personal Bankruptcy,”
examines the effect of expanding health insurance on a different type of social
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insurance: personal bankruptcy. When surveyed, bankruptcy filers often
report that medical bills precipitated the decision to file bankruptcy. Public
health insurance shifts the risk of high medical costs from the individual (and,
subsequently, their creditors) to the state. I find that the expansion of health
insurance coverage through the Massachusetts health reform reduced the use
of the personal bankruptcy system. Bankruptcies available to lower-income
households were particularly affected by the provision of insurance coverage.
The final essay, “Information and Default in Consumer Credit Markets:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” evaluates how consumer credit default
can be reduced “downstream” by providing lenders with better information.
I use a natural experiment occurring in an online credit market to measure
the effect of lender information on default risk. I find that giving lenders more
information about borrowers reduced defaults, particularly among high-risk
borrowers. Just as health insurance companies need to accurately price risk
in order to remain profitable, investors need information to make appropriate
lending decisions.
The government is the largest insurer in the United States, and will con-
tinue to be for the foreseeable future. In this dissertation, I quantify the
effect of different policies on health or financial outcomes. Taken together,
this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the interplay among public
policy, health care, and consumer bankruptcy and default.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE ON
EMERGENCY ROOM VISITS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE 2006
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH REFORM
Two issues have dominated the debate over health care policy in the United
States: the substantial number of uninsured persons and the rising costs
of health care. Recent federal and state health care reform legislation have
attempted to address the former problem by expanding publicly-subsidized
health insurance coverage. This expansion may exacerbate the problem of
rising health care costs because the insured use more medical services than
the uninsured (e.g., Finkelstein, Taubman, Wright, Bernstein, Gruber, New-
house, Allen, Baicker, and the Oregon Health Study Group (2011), Hadley
and Holahan (2003)). Proponents of health reform counter this by arguing
that health insurance may alter the type of care purchased by consumers, for
example by increasing primary and preventive care and decreasing the use
of the hospital emergency room (ER). As a result, the cost of health may
decrease.
Several observations support the idea that expanding insurance coverage
will improve the efficiency of health services in general and ER care in par-
ticular. First, the uninsured are more likely than the insured to report that
the cost of care has caused them to delay, or fail to obtain, needed care (e.g.,
Ayanian, Weissman, Schneider, Ginsburg, and Zaslavsky (2000), Weissman,
Stern, Fielding, and Epstein (2000)). This may result in them using the
emergency room more, although the evidence to support this point is weak
(e.g., Blanchard, Haywood, and Scott (2003), Zuckerman and Shen (2004)).
Second, the majority of emergency room visits do not lead to a hospital ad-
mission and a sizeable fraction of these could have been treated at a physi-
cian’s office. The uninsured may choose to seek care in the emergency room
because, unlike private physician’s offices, emergency rooms are legally ob-
ligated to treat people, even if they cannot pay for services. In 2005 in
Massachusetts, over 80 percent of ER visits did not lead to an inpatient ad-
mission to the hospital. Of these outpatient visits, approximately 18 percent
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were for events classified as non-urgent (e.g., sore throat) and 16 percent
were classified as treatable in a primary care setting (e.g., ear infection).
Notably, treating non-urgent and primary care preventable illnesses in the
emergency room is more expensive than treating these illnesses in the physi-
cian’s office (Bamezai, Melnick, and Nawathe (2005)). Expanding insurance
coverage could reduce emergency room use by preventing true emergencies
and by re-directing non-urgent care to the physician’s office.
There is a voluminous literature to support the argument that expanding
publicly-subsidized health insurance leads people to consume more medical
care (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2007), Aizer (2007)). However, there is
little evidence about how insurance influences the place and cost-effectiveness
of care and, more specifically, whether emergency room use is affected. This
is an important shortcoming in the literature because part of the support for
expanding publicly-subsidized health insurance comes from the belief that it
will be cost-reducing and health-improving by increasing access to primary
and preventive care services.
I evaluate the effect of health insurance on the use of the emergency
room using the near-universal expansion of health insurance coverage in Mas-
sachusetts. In 2006, Massachusetts simultaneously mandated that all state
residents must have insurance (or pay a sizable non-compliance fee) and dra-
matically increased free and subsidized insurance for low- and middle-income
residents. I perform a county-level analysis that exploits the variation in the
intensity of the impact of the reform across counties. Counties with relatively
higher pre-reform insurance rates experienced a smaller rise in insurance cov-
erage than counties with lower initial insurance rates, and I measure whether
the change in ER usage was proportionally larger in counties with higher ex-
posure to the law. Additionally, I compare counties in Massachusetts to
similar counties in four nearby states (Connecticut, New Jersey, Vermont
and Rhode Island). Exploiting the variation in treatment intensity allows
me to identify how expanding insurance coverage affected ER visits in a way
that is robust to Massachusetts-specific time trends.
I find that the reform had two distinct effects on ER usage. First, the
reform significantly reduced total ER visits. A one percentage point increase
in insurance coverage predicts a reduction in ER usage of 0.5 ER visits per
100 residents in the county. Because the reform reduced the uninsurance
rate in Massachusetts by at least 4.8 percentage points, my estimates imply
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that the reform reduced ER usage by 2.4 visits per 100 residents. Relative to
the statewide pre-reform usage rate (44 visits per 100 people per year), this
represents a total reduction in ER usage of 5 percent.
Second, the reform substantially reduced ER visits for events that can be
treated in a physician’s office, implying that insurance induces substitution
away from hospital ERs and toward more appropriate care settings. The
reduction in emergency room visits is largest Monday through Friday, when
doctor’s offices tend to be open, and significantly smaller overnight and on the
weekend, consistent with people substituting away from emergency rooms for
less serious conditions and when more convenient substitutes are available.
In contrast, I find no effect of the reform on emergent, non-preventable visits
(e.g., heart attack) and almost no effect on injuries. Overall, I conclude that
the reform led to more appropriate use of hospital emergency rooms.
2.1 Insurance Coverage, Emergency Room Use, and
the 2006 Massachusetts Reform
Emergency rooms are intended to treat acute medical conditions. The fed-
eral Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, passed in 1986,
requires hospitals to treat all patients with medical emergencies regardless
of their ability to pay. This mandate does not extend to private physician
offices, however, which creates an incentive for those without the means to
pay for care to use the ER for care that could be provided elsewhere. Indeed,
surveys of emergency room patients consistently find that the most common
self-reported reason for their ER visit is lack of access to primary care (New-
ton, Keirns, Cunningham, Hayward, and Stanley (2008)). It is important
to understand whether insurance influences the decision to use the ER, a
private physician’s office, or to forgo care altogether. Many medical services
are less expensive to provide in an office setting than in an ER (Bamezai
et al. (2005)). Moreover, treatment quality is likely to be higher when pro-
vided by a specialist or in a setting designed for regular care, rather than by
providers who are trained in emergency medicine. Inducing appropriate use
of the ER can reduce overall health costs and improve care. The provision of
insurance to the uninsured is important in this process because it may lead
individuals who cannot otherwise pay to seek care in the most appropriate
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setting, rather than going to the ER simply because they cannot be denied
services.
Understanding the causal effect of insurance coverage on medical use in
general, and on ER usage in particular, is complicated by the relationship
between insurance status, socioeconomic status, risk preferences, and other
characteristics that influence medical care use. For example, being econom-
ically disadvantaged is correlated with being uninsured, poor health, un-
healthy behaviors, and exposure to violence. All of these variables affect ER
usage but cannot be perfectly controlled for in a regression framework. A
credible inference about the causal effect of insurance on ER usage requires a
source of exogenous variation in insurance that is unrelated to the underlying
propensity to use the ER.
Several studies use quasi-experimental methods to analyze the effect of
insurance coverage on the of medical services (Newhouse (1993), Finkelstein
(2007), Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2007), Dafny and Gruber (2005)). These
studies indicate that insurance tends to increase consumption of medical ser-
vices. Some studies address emergency room use specifically. Anderson,
Dobkin, and Gross (2012) examine the effect of children “aging out” (be-
coming ineligible for coverage) of their parents’ health insurance at age 18
and find this reduction in coverage significantly reduces hospital and emer-
gency department use. In contrast, I find that insurance coverage decreases
ER usage significantly. The reason for this difference may be due to the
different populations of interest: I study a change in health insurance cov-
erage to the a large fraction of the uninsured population of Massachusetts,
primarily an economically disadvantaged group. Finally, the Oregon Medi-
caid Experiment (Finkelstein et al. (2011)) also examines emergency room
care, but lacks the statistical power to draw conclusions about the effect of
insurance on emergency room use.
In this study, I use the exogeneous change in insurance coverage induced
by a major health care reform in Massachusetts to study the effect of in-
surance coverage on emergency room use. In 2006, Massachusetts enacted a
major health care reform act aimed at expanding health insurance coverage
to nearly all state residents. This act combined an individual mandate to
purchase insurance with a major expansion of the Medicaid program and new
subsidies for individuals earning up to 300 percent of the federal poverty line.
Under the new law, all residents must purchase health insurance that meets
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minimum coverage standards as long as affordable coverage is available. Fail-
ure to purchase insurance under the new law results in loss of the income tax
personal exemption, $219 in 2007, with additional monthly penalties of up to
50 percent of the price of the least-costly available insurance plan beginning
in 2008. The mandate covers almost all Massachusetts residents, excluding
only individuals who have recognized religious objections. For a detailed
description of the reform, see Gruber (2008) or Raymond (2007).
In addition to the mandate, Massachusetts dramatically increased free and
subsidized coverage to low-income households. The “MassHealth” Medicaid
program expanded eligibility for low-income individuals and children and re-
moved caseload caps on residents with disabilities, people living with HIV,
and the long-term unemployed. Massachusetts also introduced a new pro-
gram, “Commonwealth Care,” that provides publicly-subsidized private in-
surance to individuals who are not eligible for employer-provided coverage or
MassHealth, and who earn up to 300 percent of the federal poverty line (with
the level of subsidies based on income). Private health insurance providers
were obligated by the law to provide coverage for young adults on their par-
ents’ plans for up to two years after they are no longer dependents or until
their 26th birthday.
Prior to the reform, uninsured Massachusetts residents earning under 200
percent of the federal poverty level had necessary hospital care paid for by
the Uncompensated Care Pool. The goal of this state-run program was to al-
leviate hospitals of bad debt that resulted from the federal mandate to treat
the uninsured and indigent in the emergency room regardless of their ability
to pay. One might worry that the existence of the uncompensated care pool
encouraged high levels of emergency room usage in Massachusetts prior to the
reform and restricts the ability of researchers to generalize the Massachusetts
experience to other states. However, uncompensated care programs are not
unique to Massachusetts and similar programs exist in Maine, Rhode Island,
Ohio, New Jersey, Washington D.C., and others.1 Furthermore, several stud-
ies indicate that significant hospital charity care (free medical care given to
low income patients) exists in all states, including those without uncompen-
sated care pools (e.g.,Congressional Budget Office (2006), Langland-Orban,
Pracht, and Salyani (2005), and Melnick, Mann, and Golan (1989)). Charity
1Some states do not mandate charity care but do reimburse hospitals for uncompen-
sated care, e.g., Pennsylvania and California.
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care may be common among emergency room visits because the costs of en-
forcing payment among low-income uninsured patients exceeds the expected
revenue and because these patients cannot be legally turned away even if it
is clear they cannot afford services.
For an uninsured person below 200 percent of the federal poverty line in
Massachusetts, the reform either did not change or marginally increased the
cost of an emergency room visit, but it reduced the price of an office visit.
The 2006 reform replaced the Uncompensated Care Pool with the Health
Safety Net program that provided free or subsidized hospital care to those
that remained uninsured after the reform. Residents whose ER visits were
previously paid for by the Uncompensated Care Pool are eligible for fully-
subsidized Commonwealth Care if their incomes are less than 100 percent
of the federal poverty line and eligible for MassHealth if they meet certain
criteria (see Raymond (2007)). Both of these programs carry emergency
room copayments of $3 or less. Residents with incomes between 100 and 200
percent of the poverty line and who are ineligible for MassHealth may enroll
in partially subsidized Commonwealth Care, which carries a $50 copayment
for outpatient ER visits.
The expected effect of the reform on emergency room use is not obvious a
priori. Out of pocket costs of medical care fell for some uninsured residents
because they gained coverage, inducing them to use more medical care in
general. However, as the price of an ER visit relative to a doctor’s visit
changed, those affected by the reform may have changed the composition
of medical services used. As demand for health services increased, some
residents already insured before the reform may have experienced “spillover”
effects; for example, it may have become more difficult to get a doctor’s
appointment as the newly-insured crowded out existing patients.
The reform may have also affected the supply of health services. For
example, if the increase in demand raised the price of medical care, the
reform may have attracted providers, including retail clinics, to move into
the state. The expansion in insurance coverage may have also affected a
hospital’s incentive to admit a patient to the hospital rather than to treat
the patient on an outpatient basis. Ultimately, the net effect of the reform
on emergency room use is an empirical question.
Recent research has explored the impact of the Massachusetts reform on
medical care. Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) use a difference-in-difference
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model to examine the impact of the reform on inpatient hospital visits, in-
cluding those originating from the emergency room. Using data from a 20
percent sample of all inpatient visits, they find that the overall number of
hospital discharges did not change in Massachusetts relative to other states
as a result of the reform, but the percentage of hospital visits originating in
the ER fell. They do not, however, study the 80 percent of ER visits that
are conducted entirely on an outpatient basis, which is an important margin
for adjustment as it may be affected by substitution towards primary care.2
My analysis advances this research by looking at a full census of both
outpatient and inpatient emergency room visits. In Massachusetts, over 80
percent of all ER patients are released the same day they are treated. More-
over, most of the concern about insurance and ER use centers on outpatient
visits because less-expensive office-based care is often an appropriate sub-
stitute. A reduction in total ER visits may result from both substitution
toward more appropriate care and from avoiding medical emergencies in the
first place by greater use of preventive services and primary care.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of outpatient and inpatient emer-
gency room visits from 2005 and provides suggestive evidence that insurance
status influences how patients use the emergency room.3 The first row of
Table 2.1 provides estimates from the 2005 Current Population Survey that
show that the 2005 uninsurance rate was 9.2 percent in Massachusetts. The
remaining rows of Table 2.1 compare the characteristics of uninsured and
insured emergency room users in Massachusetts in 2005, the year prior to
the reform, using a complete database on all emergency room visits in the
state provided by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and
Policy. The statistics are based on approximately 2.7 million patient-level
observations. Although only 9.2 percent of the population, the uninsured
account for 13.2 percent of all ER visits and 14.9 percent of outpatient ER
visits in the state. The uninsured who visit the ER are more likely to be
male and non-white than the insured. On average, uninsured ER users are
younger than the insured.
2Hosseini and Weinberg (2010) also compare the change in ER usage in Massachusetts
before and after the reform to the change in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Maine using the Community Tracking Household Survey. Due to their limited sample
size, however, their results are imprecise cannot rule out substantial increases or decreases
in ER usage.
3Visits that are admitted on an observation basis are included in outpatient visits.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of the Massachusetts Population and Emergency
Room Visits, 2005
All Visits Uninsured Insured
Percentage of Total Population1 – 9.2 (0.60) 90.8 (0.60)
Percentage of ER Visits – 13.23 (0.00) 86.77 (0.00)
Percentage of Outpatient ER Visits – 14.90 (0.00) 85.10 (0.00)
Characteristics of ER visits in Massachusetts:
Average Age 35.94 (0.02) 32.09 (0.01) 41.21 (0.00)
Fraction Female 0.51 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) 0.53 (0.00)
Fraction Non-White 0.27 (0.00) 0.40 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00)
Fraction of Visits that are:
Non-Urgent 0.18 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00)
Emergent, Primary Care Treatable 0.16 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00) 0.16 (0.00)
Emergent, Primary Care Preventable 0.08 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Emergent, Not Preventable/Avoidable 0.18 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00)
Injuries 0.28 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) 0.29 (0.00)
Other 0.12 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the 2005 Emergency Department Database and
Inpatient Database provided by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy; sample size is 2306181
1. Source: Current Population Survey insurance coverage estimates
In 2005, there were 361,128 ER visits in Massachusetts by self-pay or free-
care patients.4 According to data from the CPS from that year, the number
of uninsured residents in Massachusetts was 583,000, implying a baseline
average number of visits for an uninsured resident of 0.62.5 In the same year
there were 2,369,475 insured ER visits and about 5,745,000 insured residents,
or a baseline usage rate of 0.41.
Table 1 also provides evidence that the uninsured use the ER in lieu of
office-based care. Twenty-three percent of the ER visits by the uninsured are
classified as non-urgent versus 17 percent among the insured.6 Nineteen per-
4Free care refers to patients whose visits are covered by the Massachusetts uncompen-
sated care pool. Free care also paid for some visits from under-insured low-income patients
whose insurance does not cover emergency room visits. These patients are included in the
uninsured category in Table 2.1.
5ER use is dominated by a small subset of the population who use the ER very heavily,
while many people never use the ER. As a result, the average number of visits per person
is considerably higher than the median. For example, Fuda and Immekus (2006) find that
only one percent of all adults in Massachusetts account for 18 percent of all visits.
6I classify ER severity using an algorithm developed by Billings, Parikh, and Mijanovich
(2000a) based on diagnostic codes. See Section 6 for more discussion of the classification
system.
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cent of visits by the uninsured are classified as emergent, but primary care
treatable; this rate is 16 percent among the insured. Six percent of visits
by the uninsured are classified as emergent and primary-care preventable, as
compared to 8 percent of visits by the insured. The uninsured are signifi-
cantly less likely than the insured to use the ER for unavoidable emergencies
and injuries.
2.2 The Impact of the 2006 Health Reform on
Insurance Coverage
The 2006 reform substantially increased insurance coverage in Massachusetts.
According to the Current Population Survey, the average uninsurance rate in
Massachusetts in 2004-2006 was about 11.8 percent among the non-elderly
population and 10.3 percent for all residents, low relative to the national
non-elderly uninsurance rate of 17.3 percent and overall uninsurance rate of
15.3. The Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority (2009) re-
ports that approximately 98 percent of taxpayers were compliant with the
new law in 2007 and 2008. Long and Phadera (2009) analyze data from
the Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey (a survey fielded by the Mas-
sachusetts Division of Health Care Policy) and estimate an uninsurance rate
of 2.6 percent among all Massachusetts residents, 1.2 percent among children,
and 3.7 percent among non-elderly adults. They note that this uninsurance
rate is slightly lower than estimates they obtain from the Current Popula-
tion Survey (5.5 percent uninsurance among the entire population), National
Health Interview Survey (3.0 percent), and American Community Survey
(4.1 percent). These differences across surveys are due to sampling varia-
tion, as well as slight differences in the wording of the insurance questions.
Estimates in Long, Stockley, and Yemane (2009) and Kolstad and Kowalski
(2010) are consistent with these post-reform uninsurance rates. It is clear
that the uninsurance rate was cut by at least half, and potentially by as much
as 75 percent.
Figure 2.1 plots estimates of insurance coverage for all state residents from
the Current Population Survey for Massachusetts, an average among several
comparison states (Connecticut, New Jersey, Vermont and Rhode Island),
and the entire United States between 1999 and 2008. In 1999, the unin-
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surance rate in Massachusetts and in the comparison states was 8.9 and 9.2
percent respectively, 5.1 and 4.8 percentage points lower than the nation as a
whole. Between 1999 and 2005, the uninsurance rate rose nationwide, in Mas-
sachusetts, and in the comparison states; all appear to follow the same trend.
However, the 2006 reform caused the uninsurance rate in Massachusetts to
decline sharply. Prior to the reform (2004-2006), the average uninsurance
rate in Massachusetts was 10.3 percent. This fell to around 5.5 percent in
2007 and 2008.
Figure 2.1: Percentage Uninsured in Massachusetts and Control States,
1999-2008
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates of uninsurance rate. Comparison
states are Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont. Available here:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/index.html
While the reform substantially increased overall insurance coverage, the
effect was not uniform across counties. The Census Bureau produces Small
Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE), estimates of the non-elderly unin-
surance rate by county. These are model-based estimates that use data
from the Current Population Survey, administrative data from Medicaid,
and county demographic characteristics to estimate the annual uninsurance
rate for people under 65. Prior to the reform there was significant variation
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in coverage at the county level within Massachusetts, ranging from under
10 percent in Norfolk and Worcester counties to over 15 percent in Suffolk,
Nantucket and Dukes. The first panel of Figure 2.2 displays the uninsurance
rate by county in 2005, before the reform, and the second panel displays the
uninsurance rate in 2008. After the reform, the uninsurance rate fell sub-
stantially in all counties, but the largest gains in insurance coverage were in
counties that had the lowest coverage rates before the reform.
Figure 2.2: County-Level Uninsurance Rate
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Source: Small Area Health Insurance Estimates, U.S. Census
I formally estimate the differential effect of the reform on insurance cover-
age across counties between 2005 and 2008 by estimating
Uninsuredit =I(ci) + α2Post t + α3Uninsured2005i × Post t + it (2.1)
where Uninsuredit is the uninsurance rate in year t of county i, I(ci) is a
county fixed effect, Postt = 1 in 2008, the year after the reform was fully im-
plemented, and Uninsured2005i is the pre-reform uninsurance rate in 2005.
Here, the parameter α3 shows by what proportion the uninsurance rate fell
as a result of the reform from 2005 to 2008. I exclude the years 2006 and
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2007 because the SAHIE constructs the uninsurance rate in year t using the
CPS from years t− 1, t, and t+ 1. This model therefore captures the change
in insurance coverage from 2004-2006 to 2007-2009.
Table 3.1 displays the results. I find that insurance coverage increased
proportionally across counties, with each percentage point of the county’s
pre-reform uninsurance rate associated with a 0.73 percentage point increase
in insurance coverage. This result indicates that counties with higher unin-
surance rates prior to the reform experienced larger coverage gains and vali-
dates the use of the pre-reform uninsurance rate as a measure of the impact
of the reform. This estimate will be used to scale the observed changes in
ER use. In Column 2, I show that the result is similar if I include controls
for county characteristics; specifically, the county-level unemployment rate,
percent black, and median income in the county.7
Table 2.2: Regression estimates of the effect of the reform on the
uninsurance rate
Dependent Variable: Uninsurance Rate
Post*Uninsured2005 -0.73 (0.04)*** -0.66 (0.04)*** – –
Post*Treated – – -0.06 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.01)***
2005 Average: 0.13
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Significance Levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. Source: Small Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. Census.
In the third and fourth columns I show estimates from a model in which
I replace the variable Uninsured2005i with an indicator variable, Treatedi,
that takes a value of 1 if the county has an uninsurance rate in the up-
per quartile prior to the reform, i.e., an uninsurance rate greater than 12.6
percent. The results indicate that, while insurance coverage increased in all
counties, counties with the highest uninsurance rates before the reform gained
6 percentage points of insurance coverage more on average. This change in
insurance between the two groups of counties will be useful in interpreting
results later that compare changes in emergency room usage across groups
7Data on the county unemployment rate comes from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics; data on county-level demographic characteristics, such as me-
dian income and percent black, come from Small Area Income and Poverty
Estimates based on the American Community Survey and the county pop-
ulation estimates from the Census Bureau. These data were downloaded
from http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/, http://www.bls.gov/lau/ and
http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statecounty/data/index.html
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of counties.
2.3 The Impact of the 2006 Health Reform on
Emergency Room Visits
My analysis uses two types of variation to identify the effect of insurance
coverage on emergency room usage. First, I analyze the relative change in
ER usage in Massachusetts counties based on their exposure to the reform as
measured by the pre-reform uninsurance rate. Because the reform instituted
near-universal coverage, counties with high rates of insurance coverage prior
to the reform experienced a smaller change in insurance coverage than coun-
ties with fewer insured residents. We should expect to see ER usage decline
in counties with relatively high pre-reform uninsurance rates relative to less-
affected counties. Second, I compare variation in ER use in Massachusetts
counties with variation in counties in the comparison states of Connecti-
cut, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont. These estimates are robust
to Massachusetts-specific shocks and differential trends in ER use between
Massachusetts and other states.
2.3.1 Within-Massachusetts Analysis
I first analyze the effect of the reform by comparing ER trends across Mas-
sachusetts counties. The data come from the Acute Hospital Case Mix
Databases provided by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance
and Policy. I use quarterly data from 2002 to 2008 and aggregate the data on
ER visits to the county-level and match it to county-level uninsurance rates
and other characteristics. I generate per-capita emergency room visit rates
by dividing ER visits in a given county and quarter by the Census Bureau’s
estimated county population.8 If insurance coverage causes patients to use
the ER less frequently, ER usage should fall in counties that experienced
larger increases in insurance coverage relative to other counties.
8Data on zip code of residence for ER patients is available for Massachusetts ER visits
but not comparison states. For models that exclude comparison states, I find similar
results using patient county of residence, rather than hospital county, to calculate per
capita county ER rates, although the effect is smaller in some models. See the final
section of this chapter for these estimates.
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I begin by evaluating trends in emergency room usage across counties with
different 2005 uninsurance rates. My identification strategy relies on the
assumption that, if the reform had not taken place, emergency room usage
in high- and low-uninsurance counties in Massachusetts would have evolved
similarly. Therefore it is important to evaluate whether pre-reform trends in
emergency room usage were similar across counties. To test this, I estimate
PercapERit = I(ci) +
2008∑
t=2002
(βt1 × I(Year t) (2.2)
+ βt2 × I(Year t)× Uninsured2005i) + it.
If counties that were more and less affected by the reform have similar trends
before the reform, and diverge only after the reform, it provides strong ev-
idence that these changes were caused by the legislation rather than a pre-
existing differential time trend. If this is true, the coefficients on the interac-
tion terms of Uninsured2005i and the year fixed effects I(Year t) should be
zero for the years prior to the reform and negative after the reform. Figure
3.3 shows the coefficients on the term Uninsured2005i × I(Year t); the re-
gression estimates are also reported in the final section of this chapter. The
coefficient on the interaction between the year and the 2005 uninsurance rate
is plotted on the y-axis while the x-axis denotes the year. I present the re-
sults for total emergency room visits, outpatient emergency room visits and
inpatient emergency room visits per capita.
I find no significant effect of the 2005 uninsurance rate on emergency room
usage prior to the reform. The coefficients on Uninsured2005× I(Year t) are
small in magnitude and statistically not different from zero. Beginning in
fiscal year 2007, when the major features of the reform were implemented or
in the process of being implemented, I find a that the 2005 uninsurance rate
predicts a significant reduction in emergency department use. This result in-
dicates that ER usage in Massachusetts counties with high uninsurance rates
was not growing at a different rate than in other counties in Massachusetts
and the reduction in emergency room growth is attributable to the change
in the law rather than a differential trend.
To measure the effect of the reform, I model per capita ER visits in county
16
Figure 2.3: Pre-Reform Trends, 2003-2008
Dependent Variable in Caption (Per Capita)
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Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for regression estimates described
in equation (3.2). Estimates reported in the final section of this chapter. Data
source: Acute Hospital Case Mix Databases, Massachusetts Division of Health
Care Finance and Policy.
i and quarter t (PercapERit) as
PercapERit =I(ci) +
3∑
j=1
(αj1 × I(Quarter j) (2.3)
+ αj2 × I(Quarter j)× Uninsured2005i)
+ α1Xit + α2Post t + α3Implement t
+ α4Uninsured2005i × Implement t
+ α5Uninsured2005i × Post t + ηit.
The variable Uninsured2005i indicates the 2005 uninsurance rate of county
i. The variables Xit denote the demographic characteristics of the county de-
scribed in the previous section: the fraction of the county that is black, the
median income, and the county unemployment rate. I account for seasonal-
ity, and possible different seasonal patterns across high and low uninsurance
counties, with quarter fixed effects (I(Quarter = j)) and the interaction of
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these quarter fixed effects with Uninsured2005i.
9 The variable Implementt
takes a value of 1 during the implementation period of the reform: from
July of 2006 through December of 2007. During this period, all of the major
aspects of the reform, including the individual mandate, were implemented.
The variable Postt takes a value of 1 during the post-reform period, the rest
of fiscal year 2008. I include a county fixed effect, I(ci). The parameter of
interest is the interaction between the 2005 uninsurance rate and the post-
reform indicator, denoted here as α5, that measures the relative reduction in
emergency room visits in counties where the reform had a larger effect.
The first panel of Table 2.3 present the estimates of equation (2.3) where
the dependent variable is total emergency room visits. The first column shows
results that do not include controls for county demographic characteristics.
The second column presents the effect of the reform with these controls. The
standard errors are clustered by county to account for correlation in the error
terms within counties over time (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)).
Specifications with and without controls each indicate that a percentage
point increase in the 2005 uninsurance rate is associated with a subsequent
reduction in ER visits of about 0.16 visits per 100 residents per quarter.
This effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. Recall that the
estimates in Table 3.1 indicate that each percentage point of the pre-reform
uninsurance rate is associated with an increase in insurance coverage of 0.73
percentage points after the reform. Therefore, these estimates imply that
increasing insurance coverage by one percentage point reduces ER usage by
about (0.16 ∗ 4)/0.73 = 0.88 visits per 100 residents per year. Estimates
of the decline in the insurance rate in Massachusetts range from 4.8 to 7.7
percentage points. Therefore, the estimates in Table 2.3 imply that the
reform induced between 0.042 (= 4.8 ∗ 0.0088) and 0.068 (= 7.7 ∗ 0.0088)
fewer ER visits per capita. The pre-reform ER usage rate in Massachusetts
was about 0.11 visits per quarter, or 0.44 visits annually. Therefore the
estimates in Table 2.3 represent a reduction in the number of ER visits per
capita of 9.5 to 15.4 percent.
Under the assumption that the reform only affected emergency room visits
by expanding insurance coverage, the reduction in ER usage by 0.88 visits
per year can be directly interpreted as the treatment effect of gaining insur-
9Results by year are reported in the first table in the final section of this chapter. The
estimated effects are quite similar.
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ance on emergency room use. This is a large effect relative to the baseline
usage among the uninsured of 0.62 visits per year. The estimate captures
the average effect of insurance on those who gained coverage as a result of
the reform. If the reform was especially effective at expanding insurance
coverage among residents whose ER use is particularly sensitive to insurance
coverage (e.g., the chronically ill), the estimated effect of insurance may be
larger than if it had been measured across the entire population of uninsured
residents. Finally, if the reform caused some residents to move from less to
more generous insurance coverage (a change on the intensive margin) this
estimate over-estimates the treatment effect of insurance on emergency room
usage.
Panels B and C show results separately for outpatient and inpatient visits.
While patients may substitute away from outpatient ER visits and towards
other sources of care (such as doctor’s offices), inpatient visits are likely to
be affected less by insurance status. Inpatient ER visits could be affected
by improvements in health or by changes in patient behavior (e.g., making
an appointment to stay in the hospital through a doctor rather than be-
ing admitted through the ER). I find a significant reduction in outpatient
room visits. A one percentage point increase in exposure to the law reduces
outpatient emergency room visits by about 0.15 visits per 100 residents per
quarter. This is approximately equal to the effect on total visits and indi-
cates that the overall reduction in ER use is driven primarily by a reduction
in outpatient visits. The point estimates indicate that there may have been
a modest reduction in inpatient ER visits, although the effect is not signifi-
cantly different from zero.10 An F-test rejects the hypothesis the coefficients
on Post× Uninsured2005 are equal in the inpatient and outpatient models
at the 10 percent level (p-value=0.06).
Table 2.3 also presents results of a difference-in-difference model that re-
places the continuous measure of county uninsurance rate (Uninsured2005is)
with a binary indicator for counties that had 2005 uninsurance rates above
12.6 percent (the 75th percentile for Massachusetts according to the 2005
SAHIE). One advantage of using a binary indicator, rather than a continu-
ous measure, is that it is not reliant on the assumption of a linear relationship
10When I estimate a this model for all inpatient hospital visits (including those not
originating in the ER), I find that the reform had no effect on total inpatient hospital
usage.
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between insurance coverage and emergency room usage and is more robust
to measurement error in the variable Uninsured2005. In this difference-in-
difference specification, Treatedi = 1 for counties with the highest uninsur-
ance rates. I estimate
PercapERit =I(ci) +
3∑
j=1
(αj1 × I(Quarter j) (2.4)
+ αj2 × I(Quarterj )× Treated i)
+ α>2 Xit + α3Post t + α4Implement t
+ α5Treated i × Implement t
+ α5Treated i × Post t + ηit.
In this model, α4 measures how per capita ER usage in the most-affected
counties in Massachusetts changed relative to ER rates in less-affected coun-
ties over time. This model assumes that the relative reduction in ER usage
in counties with low 2005 uninsurance rates (Treated i = 0) captures the
Massachusetts-specific trend. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 present the re-
sults. I find that the reform caused ER usage to fall in the high uninsurance
counties by about 1 visit per 100 residents per quarter relative to the low
uninsurance counties. This effect is statistically significant at the one percent
level.
Recall from Table 3.1 that the treated counties gained about 6 percentage
points in insurance coverage more than the untreated counties. These results
therefore imply that insurance reduces average emergency room use by about
(1 ∗ 4)/6 = 0.67 visits per year, similar to the treatment effects found in the
previous section. This is consistent with a reduction in total visits of at least
4.8 ∗ 0.0067 = 0.032 visits per year, or a reduction of 7.3 percent relative to
the average emergency room usage of 0.44 visits per year.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.3 I present estimates where the dependent
variable is the log of the number of ER visits. This specification is pre-
ferred if there is measurement error in the estimate of the county population.
These results indicate that increasing exposure to the reform by 10 percentage
points decreases total emergency room usage by about 9 percent. Consistent
with the estimates that measure emergency usage in per capita terms, I find
a significant reduction in outpatient visits in the log specification of about 9
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percent for every ten percentage point increase in the pre-reform uninsurance
rate. In contrast, I do not find a significant reduction in inpatient visits.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.3 present the estimates of a model that replaces
Uninsured2005 with a binary indicator (Treated) that the county is among
the most affected by the reform. Consistent with other results presented
in this section, I find that the treated counties experienced a significant
reduction in ER use relative to the untreated counties.
The final panel of Table 2.3 displays the results of placebo tests that esti-
mate the effect of the reform as if it had occurred in one of the comparison
states. The purpose of these estimates is to assess the likelihood of finding
a “false positive” when studying the Massachusetts reform. The comparison
state data are only available on an annual basis from 2005 to 2008, resulting
in low power. I use 2008 as the post-reform period in these placebo tests and
2006 and 2007 as the implementation period, and estimate a model similar
to (2.3). All but one of these estimates are not statistically different from
zero; one is marginally significant at the 10 percent level. In the next sec-
tion, I use these comparison states to control for possible confounding shocks
to ER usage that are associated with the 2005 uninsurance rate and occur
concurrently with the 2006 reform.11
2.3.2 Across State and Across County Analysis
In this section, I expand upon the previous analysis by comparing ER use
in Massachusetts to that in Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut and New
Jersey. The addition of comparison states allows me to control for both
Massachusetts-specific trends as well as unrelated contemporaneous changes
in ER usage among counties with high 2005 uninsurance rates. If the reform
reduced ER usage, ER rates should fall in Massachusetts counties relative to
those in comparison states, with the most pronounced reductions occurring
in counties that experienced the largest increase in insurance coverage.
The comparison states were chosen because of their geographic proximity
11Another natural robustness check is to examine the effect of the reform on elderly
residents, as coverage in this group was very high prior to the reform. However, a year-by-
year analysis indicates that differential trends in ER use among the elderly existed even
prior to the reform. It is therefore unclear whether any effects on the elderly are a result
of the reform via spillover effects or are capturing a different trend in ER use over time in
this group.
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to Massachusetts and because they collect and make available the relevant
emergency department usage data. I obtain these data directly from each
state’s department of health. Data in the comparison states is only available
for 2005 to 2008, and only on an annual basis. Data from Vermont and Rhode
Island are collected on a calendar year basis, whereas data from Connecticut
are collected on a fiscal year basis. New Jersey and Massachusetts ER counts
are available by month.12 Here I present results pooling all five states and
ignoring the distinction between fiscal and calendar year data; results by fiscal
year (excluding Vermont and Rhode Island) and calendar year (excluding
Connecticut) are similar.
I model per capita ER rates in county i, in state s, and during year t as
PercapERist =I(ci) + α
>
1 Xist + α2Post t (2.5)
+ α3Implement t + α4MAis × Implement t + α5MAis × Post t
+ α6Uninsured2005is × Implement t
+ α7Uninsured2005is × Post t
+ α8Uninsured2005is ×MAis × Implement t
+ α9Uninsured2005is ×MAis × Post t + ηist.
In this model, α9 measures the effect of the reform on ER rates for each
additional percentage point in the county uninsurance rates. The variable
MAis equals 1 for counties in Massachusetts. I also include county fixed
effects, I(ci). In this specification, the interaction term MAis × Postt con-
trols for any difference in trends in ER usage between Massachusetts and
the comparison states that are common to all Massachusetts counties and
Uninsured2005is × Postt controls for trends associated with the 2005 unin-
surance rate. This specification therefore relies on weaker identification as-
sumptions than the models in Section 5.1. The variable Postt = 1 for all of
2008, and zero otherwise, and Implementt = 1 for all of 2006 and 2007, and
zero otherwise. I also estimate similar models that replace Uninsured2005is
with the binary variable Treatedis = 1 that indicates a county has a 2005
uninsurance rate above 12.6, the upper quartile for Massachusetts.
The results are presented in Table 2.4. I find that the reform reduced
12About 6 percent of ER visits in New Jersey are recorded with a year, but not a month.
I allocate these equally across all months.
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total visits, and this reduction is driven by a significant decline in outpatient
visits. I find the reform increased inpatient visits, although this effect is not
significantly different from zero. Each percentage point increase in exposure
to the law is associated with a reduction in ER visits of about 0.36 total
visits per 100 residents per year. This result is consistent with a treatment
effect of insurance on ER use of −0.36/0.73 = −0.49 and a total effect of the
reform of between 0.49 ∗ 4.8 = 2.35 and 0.49 ∗ 7.7 = 3.77 fewer visits per 100
residents per year, a reduction of 5.3 to 8.6 percent. The next row reports
the results of a specification that replaces the variable Uninsured2005 with
a binary indicator that the county was in the most-affected (treated) group.
I find that the treated counties experienced a reduction of between 0.4 and
0.6 visits per 100 residents relative to the untreated counties, significant at
the 1% level. In the specification that uses the log of total ER visits as
the dependent variable, I find that increasing exposure to the reform by 10
percentage points reduced emergency room visits by about 7 percent in the
post reform period in the treated counties relative to the untreated counties.
The lower panel of Table 2.3 shows results for outpatient and inpatient
visits separately. Similar to the results that use only Massachusetts counties,
I find that the reform reduced outpatient visits substantially but had little
effect on inpatient visits. A ten percentage point increase in exposure to the
reform reduced outpatient ER visits significantly by about 4 visits per 100
residents. I find that outpatient emergency room usage fell in the treated
counties by between 0.04 and 0.06 visits per person relative to the untreated
counties, accounting for all of the total reduction in emergency room visits.
In contrast, I do not find any evidence that inpatient visits fell as a result of
the law.
2.4 Did the Reform Cause a Change in the
Composition of ER Visits?
The results in the previous section indicate that the 2006 reform reduced
overall ER usage in Massachusetts. This section presents analyses of the
types of conditions that were most impacted by the reform. If gaining access
to insurance leads people to substitute office-based care for the emergency
room, the decrease in ER visits should be concentrated among those condi-
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tions that are not urgent and can most easily be treated in an alternative
setting. In contrast, some serious medical emergencies cannot be treated in
a private physician’s office; if substitution is driving the overall reduction in
ER care, these types visits should not experience a reduction. This section
concludes by examining the impact of the reform on ER visits during regular
and off-hours.
2.4.1 What type of ER visits were affected by the reform?
The widely-used New York University Emergency Department (NYU ED)
visit severity algorithm developed by John Billings and colleagues at New
York University (see, e.g., Billings, Parikh, and Mijanovich (2000b)) classi-
fies all outpatient ER visits into general categories based on the patient’s
diagnostic code:
(1) Non-urgent: Medical care not needed within 12 hours (e.g., sore throats).
(2) Emergent/Primary Care Treatable: Medical care needed within 12
hours but safely treatable in a primary care setting (e.g., an ear in-
fection).
(3) Emergent/Preventable: ER care needed but the patient could have
avoided the medical issue if they had received timely and effective out-
patient care (e.g., an asthma attack).
(4) Emergent/Not Preventable: ER care needed, not preventable (e.g., a
cardiac disrhythmia).
(5) Injury (e.g., a broken leg).
(6) “Other”: Alcohol- and drug-related diagnoses, mental-health related
medical problems, and unclassified.
High levels of emergency visits in categories (1) through (3) are symptoms
that an individual has limited access to other sources of regular care besides
the emergency room (Billings et al. (2000a)). The prevalence of these types
of visits should decrease when a person gains insurance if insurance leads
people to seek out a regular source of care or increase their use of preventive
care. Categories (4) through (6) could increase as a result of the reform if
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the uninsured were deterred from using the ER because of costs, though it is
also reasonable to presume the prevalence of these categories would not be
affected at all.
Since it is not possible to ascertain with certainty the degree to which
an ER visit was emergent and/or preventable, the typical practice is to as-
sign each visit a probability of being in each of the six categories based on
the particular diagnosis code. The probabilities are assigned as in Billings
et al. (2000b) using the “Algorithm for Classifying Emergency Department
Utilization” provided by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.13
Because the classification system was designed for outpatient visits, many
inpatient diagnoses are not included in the classification system. To prevent
most inpatient visits from being unclassified, I make the assumption that
inpatient ER visits do not fall in the non-urgent or primary care treatable
categories, and are considered non-preventable emergencies unless otherwise
classified as preventable, injury, or alcohol-, drug-, and mental health-related.
If I simply drop inpatient visits with missing classifications, results are simi-
lar.
A sample of these classification probabilities are given in Table 2.5. For
example, the first row shows that for all diagnoses of a urinary tract infection
that appear in the ER, on average, 46 percent do not require medical care
within 12 hours, 30 percent require medical care but can be safely treated at a
physician’s office, and 24 percent require emergency care but could have been
prevented if the patient had visited a physician’s office in time. Table 2.1
shows the distribution of visits across these categories. Eighteen percent of all
visits in Massachusetts are classified as “Non-urgent,” 16 percent are “Emer-
gent/Primary Care Treatable,” and 8 percent are “Emergent/Preventable.”
Thus, roughly 42 percent of visits are in the categories that could potentially
be reduced by insurance coverage.
I begin by aggregating to the county level the number of Massachusetts
ER visits falling into the categories non-urgent, emergent and primary-care
treatable, emergent and preventable, emergent and non-preventable and in-
jury (categories (1) through (5)). I divide by county population to arrive at a
13The algorithm used to assign emergency department visits to categories is available
at http://www.ahrq.gov/data/safetynet/toolsoft.htm
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per capita annual rate for each category.14 I am unable to perform a similar
classification with the comparison states, because data on comparison state
emergency room usage only includes the number of visits by hospital and
admission status, but not visit-level characteristics such as diagnosis.
I model the per capita usage rate for visits of type k as
PercapTypekit = I(ci) +
3∑
j=1
(λj1I(Quarter j) (2.6)
+ λj2I(Quarter j)× Uninsured2005)
+ λ>1 Xit + λ2Implement t + λ3Post t
+ λ4Uninsured2005i ∗ Implement t
+ λ5Uninsured2005i ∗ Post t + it.
As in the previous section, Uninsured2005it is the county uninsurance rate in
2005, Xit denote county characteristics (unemployment rate, median income,
percent black), I(ci) are county fixed effects, I(Quarterj ) are quarter fixed
effects that are also interacted with Uninsured2005 to account for seasonal
patterns. The indicator variable Implementt equals 1 during the implemen-
tation period (the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006 through the first quarter
of fiscal year 2008) and Postt equals 1 during the post-reform period (quar-
ters 2 through 4 of 2008). In this section, I do not report estimates that use
the binary “Treated” indicator to measure exposure to the reform. Results
using this specification are qualitatively similar and can be found in the last
section.
As in the previous section, I assume that in the absence of the reform, ER
usage in high- and low-uninsurance counties would have evolved similarly,
and that any differences are therefore a result of the 2006 reform. Figure
2.4 plots the coefficient on the interaction between Uninsured2005i and a
set of year binary variables for years 2002 to 2008, as described in equation
(3.2). Although the series are slightly more volatile when broken down into
categories, Figure 3.3 indicates that trends in ER usage were not predicted
by the 2005 uninsurance rate before 2007, and that differential trends in
14For emergencies, I include only diagnoses which always fall in to the “emergent, not
preventable/avoidable” category, i.e. “emergent, not preventable/avoidable”=1, in order
to avoid ambiguous cases which could be non-emergencies or primary-care treatable and
therefore affected by the reform differently.
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non-urgent, primary-care treatable and preventable visits were not present
(or were small) prior to the reform. These estimates are reported in the last
section.
Table 2.6 presents estimates of equations (2.6), both with and without
controls. In both specifications, I find that the counties that experienced
the largest increase in insurance rates also experienced the largest reductions
in visits classified as non-urgent and primary-care treatable. In contrast, I
find almost no effect on emergency visits or injuries.15 Pairwise comparisons
reveal that the effect of the reform on non-urgent, primary-care treatable
and preventable visits is significantly larger than the effect on injuries and
non-preventable emergencies at the 5 percent level or better. An F-test also
rejects the null hypothesis that all effects are equal.
The first column of Table 2.6 indicates that a one-percentage point increase
in the 2005 uninsurance rate is associated with a significant reduction in
non-urgent ER visits of 0.11 per 100 resident quarterly and in emergent,
primary-care treatable visits of 0.03 per 100 residents quarterly. Emergent
but preventable visits declined by 0.01 visit per 100 residents quarterly, but
this effect is only marginally significant at the ten percent level. In contrast,
I find no statistically significant effect for non-preventable emergencies, such
as heart attacks, or injuries. Recall from Table 2.3 that the reform induced a
total reduction of about 0.16 visits per 100 residents per quarter. The results
from Table 2.6 imply that around 69 percent of this decrease is accounted
for by a reduction in non-urgent ER visits and the remainder is due to a
reduction in emergent, but primary-care treatable or preventable visits.
I also present estimates in Table 2.6 using log of the number of visits in
each category as the dependent variable. I find that a ten percentage point
increase in the 2005 uninsurance rate, associated with a 10 ∗ 0.73 = 7.3
increase in insurance coverage, is associated with a reduction in non-urgent
emergency room visits of about 26 percent. A similar increase in coverage
results in reduction in primary-care treatable visits of 13.3 percent. In the
15Examining emergency room visits separately by admission status (outpatient or inpa-
tient) shows a small reduction in inpatient non-preventable emergencies offset by a small
increase in outpatient non-preventable emergencies. This may reflect that multiple mech-
anisms are affecting emergency room use - e.g., shifting the point of first contact with
the hospital away from the ER, an increase in the use of ER for appropriate emergencies
resulting from a reduction in the price of ER visits, or changing incentives for hospital
admission.
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specification that uses log visits as the dependent variable, I do not find a
significant change in preventable emergencies, non-preventable emergencies
or injuries.
The differential impact of the reform across the various types of ER visits
provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that gaining insurance led
people to use office-based care instead of the ER for non-urgent and primary-
care treatable issues. To the extent that primary-care settings may be more
cost-effective or higher quality, this change represents an improvement in
health-related costs.
2.4.2 Weekend, Weekday and Off-Hours ER Usage
In this subsection I explore the different impact of the reform on visits that
occur during the week and those that occur overnight and on the weekends.
Analyzing visits by the time at which they occurred provides a strong cred-
ibility check on the hypothesis that the observed reduction in ER use is a
result of patients substituting away from ER care. If the reform indeed in-
duced people to use office-based care for certain events, we should expect
to see a more pronounced reduction in ER use during daytime hours when
physician’s offices and clinics are open. Visits that occur over night may also
be more serious and office-based care may be a relatively poor substitute for
these types of visits.
To estimate these differential effects, I break emergency room visits in
to three groups: weekday, weekend, and off-hours. I define a visit to be
during “off hours” if it occurs before 7am or after 8pm. Time of day is only
available for outpatient emergency room visits, so models that estimate the
change in overnight visits only include outpatient visits. Because baseline
usage is different for weekend, weekday, and off-hours visits, I use log of the
total number of these types of visits, rather than per capita usage, as my
main specification.
As in the previous two sections, I examine pre-reform trends in Figure
2.5. I find no evidence of pre-reform trends for weekday or off-hours visits,
although the 2005 uninsurance rate predicts a reduction in ER visits in 2002
and 2003 for weekend visits.
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For each visit type k, I estimate
log(#ofvisits)kit = I(ci) +
3∑
j=1
(λj1 × I(Quarter j) (2.7)
+ λj2 × I(Quarter j)× Uninsured2005i)
+ λ2Xit + λ3Implement i + λ4Post t
+ λ5Uninsured2005i ∗ Implement t
+ λ6Uninsured2005i × Post t + it,
where the control variables are those described in the previous models.
The estimates of equations (2.7) are displayed in the bottom panel of Table
2.6. The first two columns show that the reform had the largest effect on
weekday visits. An increase the effect of the reform by 10 percentage points
results in a reduction of between 8.5 and 7.8 percent in weekday visits; this
effect is significant at the 1 percent level. The effect is about half the size
on weekend visits and only significant at the 10 percent level. I find no
significant effect on overnight visits and the point estimate is small. The
estimated effect of the reform on overnight visits differs significantly from
the effect on weekday visits at the 1 percent level, although the difference in
coefficients on the weekend and weekday effects is not statistically significant.
These results are consistent with the idea that expanding insurance cover-
age leads patients to substitute away from emergency room care and towards
primary or preventive services. Visits that occur during certain times are less
amenable to substitution, either because doctors are unavailable and difficult
to reach or because the symptoms are more serious and require immediate
attention. The differential patterns in ER usage based on the time the visit
occurred indirectly confirm the hypothesis that substitution is driving the
reduction in emergency room use, rather than, e.g., a concurrent change in
the supply of medical services.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter is among the first analysis to evaluate how insurance induces
people to substitute between places of care. I study the 2006 Massachusetts
health insurance reform to evaluate the impact of insurance on the use of
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emergency room care, a relatively expensive and, in some cases, inefficient
source of health services.
In 2006, Massachusetts introduced legislation requiring that all state resi-
dents have health insurance coverage. I compare changes in ER usage both
across counties in Massachusetts and between Massachusetts and other states
to identify the causal effect of the law. The effect of the law on insurance
coverage and ER usage increases significantly with the pre-reform county
uninsurance rate, a measure of exposure to the reform. A one percentage
point increase in the pre-reform uninsurance rate predicts a reduction in ER
usage of 0.5 visits per 100 residents, or a treatment effect of insurance on
the uninsured of 0.49 fewer visits per year on average. My estimates imply
that the law reduced ER usage by between 5 and 13 percent. These results
suggest that ER usage is quite sensitive to insurance status.
Furthermore, I find the reform did not affect all visits equally. I find that
the reform led to a reduction in ER usage for non-urgent (e.g. a sore throat)
and primary-care treatable (e.g. an ear infection) events, suggesting that
the expansion of insurance coverage reduced the cost of office based care
and encouraged substitution away from the hospital emergency room and
towards primary care treatment. In contrast, I find no effect of the law on
non-preventable emergencies or injuries.
Finally, Massachusetts ER records indicate the time of day when the visit
took place. If the decrease in non-urgent visits is indeed driven by substi-
tution towards primary or regular care, the reduction should be most pro-
nounced during office hours when physician’s offices are generally open. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, I find that the law reduced non-urgent ER visits
during the day on weekdays, but had little effect on visits at night or on the
weekend. These results are consistent with the idea that insurance induces
people to use the medical care system more efficiently by seeking care in more
appropriate settings and increases their use of primary care.
This project speaks to the larger issue of the impact of insurance on medical
care usage. While an established literature has shown that insurance coverage
increases the use of medical services generally, this study provides direct
evidence that insurance may also lead consumers to purchase more efficient
or appropriate health services. Measuring the causal impact of insurance is
notoriously difficult because it requires finding exogenous sources of variation
in insurance status. The natural experiment in this chapter is a particularly
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relevant source of credible exogenous variation to study because it represents
the same type of insurance expansion program that recently occurred at
the federal level with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. By
analyzing the impact of the Massachusetts health reform on utilization, this
research contributes to the ongoing debate about the role of health insurance
subsidies and individual mandates in public policy.
2.6 Alternative Specifications and Additional Results
To identify the effect of the Massachusetts reform on ER use, I assume that
in the absence of the reform, ER use in counties across Massachusetts would
have evolved similarly over time. I present evidence that there were no pre-
reform trends in Figures 3, 4, and 5 in the main text. In this section, I present
the estimates underlying these figures and explore alternative specifications
to confirm there are no pre-reform trends.
In order to evaluate the presence of pre-reform trends in emergency room
usage associated with the 2005 uninsurance rate, I estimate
PercapTypekit = I(ci) + β
>
2 Xit (2.8)
+
2008∑
t=2002
βtI(Y eart)× Uninsured2005i + it
for different measures of emergency room use (e.g., total usage, outpatient,
non-urgent, etc), where I(.) is the indicator function. If the change in emer-
gency room use is indeed driven by the reform itself, the coefficient on the
interaction terms I(Y ear = t) ∗ Uninsured2005 should be close to zero in
the years before the reform is implemented.
Table 2.7 presents the estimates of equation (2.8). In models both with
and without controls, I find no systematic difference in the growth rates
across counties with different uninsurance rates prior to the reform, and a
significant reduction in 2007 and 2008, following the reform’s implementation
for total emergency room visits, outpatient, non-urgent, primary-care treat-
able and preventable visits. I find no significant change for non-preventable
emergencies and injury visits following the reform. I find a small, marginally
significant reduction in inpatient emergency room visits in 2007 and 2008,
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but this effect becomes statistically insignificant when controls for county
characteristics are added.
In Table 2.8 I present estimates of equation (2.8) where I replace the depen-
dent variable by a log of the number of visits by county-year distinguished by
when the visit occurred. If the 2006 reform reduced emergency department
use because it induced consumers to substitute towards physician’s offices,
visits that occur late at night or on the weekend should be less affected than
visits that occur during the weekday, because doctor’s offices are less likely
to be available at these times. I find that weekend visits exhibit significant
pre-reform trends, with significant effects estimates for the years 2002 and
2003 as well as 2007 and 2008. I find no significant change in off hours vis-
its either before or after the reform. Weekday visits evolve similarly across
counties in Massachusetts prior to the reform, but the most affected counties
experience a relative reduction in 2007 and 2008, after the reform.
Additionally, I present a number of alternative versions of the main results
presented in Sections 3 and 4. Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of
the 2006 health reform on different categories of visits using a difference-in-
difference model. These estimates result from a model similar to equation
6 in the main text, but with the variable Uninsured2005 replaced with a
binary variable Treated that takes a value of 1 if the counties are in the
top quartile of the most affected. Similar results for total, outpatient, and
inpatient visits are reported in Tables 3 and 4 in the main text.
The results presented in Table 3 are similar to those found in Table 6 in the
main text. I find a significant reduction in non-urgent, primary-care treatable
and preventable visits in specifications both with and without controls for
county characteristics. I find no effect of the reform on non-preventable
emergencies such as heart attacks or injuries.
Throughout the main text, I define per capita emergency room usage in
county i as the number of visits that take place in county i divided by the
population. This definition matches the available data in the comparison
states, where information on patient residence is unknown, and allows for a
direct comparison across states. However, it may also be desirable to use the
county of residence, rather than the location of the hospital, to define emer-
gency room usage, because the 2005 uninsurance rate measures insurance
coverage among residents of the county.
In the top panel of Table 8 I present my main results using the patient’s
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county of residence to define emergency room usage. Patient zipcode is
matched to county to generate county level usage rates. Patients with missing
zipcodes are assigned to the county where the visit takes place, although I
find similar results when these observations are dropped. A small number
of zipcodes cross county borders; these zipcodes are assigned to whatever
county comprises the largest fraction of the zipcode. I find similar results as
when the location of the hospital is used to define county usage. I find that
a ten percentage point increase in the 2005 uninsurance rate (the measure of
exposure to the reform) reduces total emergency room visits by 0.009 ∗ 4 =
0.036 visits per capita annually. This result is consistent with a treatment
effect of insurance on ER usage of (0.09 ∗ 4)/0.73 = 0.49 fewer visits per
year on average, a reduction of about 80 percent from the baseline usage
rate among the uninsured. The total effect of the law is therefore between
0.49 ∗ 4.8 = 2.35 fewer visits per 100 residents, or an approximately 5.3
percent reduction, to 0.49 ∗ 7.7 = 3.78 fewer visits per 100 residents, or
a reduction of about 8.7 percent. Looking at the effect of the reform by
admission status, I find that the total reduction is driven predominantly
by a large reduction in outpatient visits; approximately 90% of the total
reduction is due to a reduction in outpatient visits. Non-urgent visits fell
significantly, although in contrast to the results presented in the main text,
the reduction in “emergent, primary-care treatable” visits is not significant.
As in the main results, I find a marginally significant reduction in preventable
visits and no effect of the reform on non-preventable emergencies. However,
I do find a significant reduction in injury visits. As the injury category is
fairly heterogeneous, including mild sprains and strains as well as broken
bones, some visits in this category may be amenable to substitution towards
non-emergency room facilities.
Regression estimates using weights of the county population are presented
in Table 9. I find a reduction in emergency room visits; a ten percentage
point increase in the 2005 uninsurance rate (equivalent to a 10 ∗ 0.73 =
7.3 percentage point increase in coverage) is associated with a reduction in
emergency room visits of 0.009∗4 = 0.36 visits per capita annually, associated
with a treatment effect of insurance on ER visits of 0.49 fewer visits per
year on average, or an 80 percent reduction from baseline usage among the
uninsured. This is consistent with a total reduction of between 0.49 ∗ 4.8 =
2.35 visits per year per 100 residents (5.3 percent) and 0.49∗7.7 = 3.77 visits
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per year per 100 residents (8.6 percent). Examining visits by admission
status, I find a large reduction in outpatient visits partially offset by a small
increase in inpatient visits. In regressions that explore the effect by type of
visit, I find that the total reduction in ER visits is being driven by a significant
reduction in non-urgent visits. Emergent, primary-care treatable also fell as
a result of the reform. The reduction in preventable visits is only significant
in the model that uses the binary “treated/not-treated” distinction. I find
no effect of the reform on non-preventable emergencies, although I do find
that the reform reduced injury visits.
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Figure 2.4: Pre-Reform Trends by Type of Visit, 2003-2008
Dependent Variable in Caption (Per Capita)
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Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for regression estimates described
in equation (3.2). Estimates reported in the last section. Data source: Acute
Hospital Case Mix Databases, Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance
and Policy.
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Figure 2.5: Pre-Reform Trends, 2002-2008
Dependent Variable in Caption (Log of Visits)
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Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for regression estimates described
in equation (3.2). Estimates reported in the final section of this chapter. Data
source: Acute Hospital Case Mix Databases, Massachusetts Division of Health
Care Finance and Policy.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF HEALTH REFORM ON
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY
When surveyed, a substantial fraction of bankruptcy filers report that med-
ical expenses played a significant role in their bankruptcy decision.1 Advo-
cates for comprehensive health care reform have used medical bankruptcy to
justify legislation designed to expand health insurance coverage, under the
assumption that insurance can alleviate the catastrophic health care costs
driving these bankruptcies. This argument relies on a causal relationship
between personal bankruptcy and health insurance coverage that, despite
the supposed prevalence of medical bankruptcy, is poorly understood. In
this paper, I evaluate the relationship between insurance coverage and per-
sonal bankruptcy by analyzing a major health care reform that substantially
expanded insurance coverage in Massachusetts.
In 2006, Massachusetts enacted health care reform aimed at achieving uni-
versal health insurance coverage within the state. This reform mandated that
all state residents must purchase health insurance, and coupled this mandate
with subsidies for low- and middle-income families. This law induced an ex-
ogenous change in insurance coverage that allows me to bypass the common
empirical problem that medical insurance coverage may be endogenously de-
termined with the bankruptcy decision. For example, the poor may forego
health coverage and small shocks of any form may lead to bankruptcy, but
the root cause of bankruptcy may be poverty rather than health insurance
coverage.
Following the identification strategy in the previous chapter, I leverage the
differential impact of the reform across Massachusetts to identify the causal
effect of insurance on personal bankruptcies. Because the new legislation
required almost all residents to obtain health insurance, counties that had a
larger fraction of uninsured residents before the reform experienced a greater
1See Dranove and Millenson (2006), Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne, and Woolhandler
(2005), and Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, and Woolhandler (2009)
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increase in insurance coverage than counties with high levels of health in-
surance coverage prior to the reform. I estimate the effect of the reform
on personal bankruptcy by comparing personal bankruptcy rates in Mas-
sachusetts with those in states that did not enact a reform and by comparing
more- and less-affected counties to similar counties across states.
I find that the personal bankruptcy rate fell in Massachusetts relative to
other states after the 2006 reform, with the largest effects in the most-affected
counties. A one percentage point increase in 2006 uninsurance rate reduces
the annual per-capita personal bankruptcy rate by about 0.03 bankruptcies
per 1000 residents. My estimates suggest that the personal bankruptcy rate
would be about 12 percent higher if the reform had not taken place.
The increases in insurance coverage as a result of the 2006 reform were
largest among low-income residents. Looking at bankruptcy by chapter, I
find a substantial reduction in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which is available al-
most exclusively to households with income below the state median, and no
effect on Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which is available to all households. This
differential effect suggests that the health reform affected low-income fam-
ilies who are more likely to gain health insurance as a result of the reform
and also more likely to declare bankruptcy because of medical bills (Dranove
and Millenson (2006)). Furthermore, I find no significant effect of the reform
on other indicators of economic activity, such as the unemployment rate or
the business bankruptcy rate, indicating that this result is driven by the im-
pact of health insurance on bankruptcy rather than an unrelated concurrent
improvement in the economic environment.
Other papers have examined the role of health insurance in the bankruptcy
decision. Gross and Notowidigdo (2010) use the expansion of Medicaid in
the 1990s to explore the causal relationship between insurance coverage and
bankruptcy, using simulated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for Medi-
caid coverage. They estimate that increasing Medicaid eligibility by 10 per-
centage points in a state reduced the bankruptcy rate by about 8.4 percent.
Their simulations suggest that among low-income households, lack of insur-
ance is responsible for approximately 26 percent of personal bankruptcies.
Mahoney (2011) shows that access to bankruptcy can substitute for high-
deductible health insurance by comparing households with similar incomes
across more and less debtor-friendly states. The Oregon Health Insurance
experiment (Finkelstein et al. (2011)) studied the effect of health insurance
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coverage on many measures of financial well-being. The authors find that
gaining health insurance reduced medical debt, the number of bills sent to
collection, and reported financial strain, indicating that health insurance cov-
erage has impacts beyond an individual’s health. However, the study did not
reach conclusive results about the effect of insurance coverage on personal
bankruptcy.
My paper is the first to explore the causal impact of a universal individ-
ual mandate for health insurance on bankruptcy rates. By analyzing the
impact of a reform that applies to all state residents, rather than a pro-
gram exclusively targeted at certain groups, I estimate the average effect of
expanding insurance to the current uninsured population. Recent federal
legislation, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, also uses
an individual mandate to increase insurance coverage. My results contribute
to this ongoing debate concerning insurance mandates and enhance the over-
all understanding of the relationship between health insurance coverage and
personal bankruptcy.
3.1 Determinants of Personal Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy allows debtors to discharge or restructure their debts. One eco-
nomic justification for bankruptcy is that it allows for smoother lifetime
consumption if borrowers face substantial uninsurable risk. When insur-
ance markets are limited, a bankruptcy system can be welfare-improving
(see Zame (1993), Zha (2001)). However, like other types of insurance,
bankruptcy creates ex-ante moral hazard. Consumers who do not have to
bear the full cost of their decisions may be more willing to take risks and
reduce precautionary savings. Athreya (2005) offers a complete survey of
equilibrium models of personal bankruptcy.
The two most common types of personal bankruptcy in the United States
are Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. When a debtor files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
non-protected assets are liquidated and distributed among creditors, but all
(or most) remaining debt is canceled. In this sense, Chapter 7 gives filers a
“clean slate” by wiping out all of their debt and allowing them to emerge
from bankruptcy debt-free. Chapter 13 bankruptcy does not result in the
liquidation of assets but instead restructures debt around a court-approved
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repayment plan. In contrast with Chapter 7, filers must continue to pay
creditors for three to five years after bankruptcy filing. As of 2005, Chapter
7 bankruptcy is only available to debtors that pass a “means test”: potential
filers must make less than the median income of their state or show that they
do not have enough disposable income to repay their debts with a Chapter
13 repayment schedule. Because of this law, Chapter 7 filers tend to have
lower income than Chapter 13 filers. For example, in 2007 the median income
for a Chapter 7 filer was $25,800 nationally ($25,888 in Massachusetts). For
Chapter 13, median income was $43,008 ($55,212 in Massachusetts).2
Several empirical studies document the factors that are associated with
personal bankruptcy. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) find that the
unemployment rate is three to four times higher among bankrupt debtors
than the national average. Agarwal and Liu (2003) find that fluctuations in
county unemployment rates have a significant impact on credit card delin-
quency behavior. The authors also find that family-related adverse events,
such as divorces, are associated with high delinquency rates. In contrast,
Hankins, Hoekstra, and Skiba (2011) find that large positive shocks (in this
case, lottery winnings) postpone rather than prevent bankruptcy, indicating
that there may be immutable individual characteristics, like impulse control,
that play a large factor in bankruptcy.
Bankrupt debtors also respond strategically to the costs associated with
bankruptcy, both the formal costs imposed by state bankruptcy laws, and
informal social costs, such as social stigma. Researchers have found empirical
evidence of the salience of both types of costs. Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang
(2012) show that liquidity constraints play a significant role in the timing of
bankruptcy, with many households waiting for a federal tax rebate in order to
afford the formal fees associated with a bankruptcy filing. Agarwal, Liu, and
Mielnicki (2003) find that states with lax bankruptcy laws experience higher
delinquency rates. Fay, Hurst, and White (1998) and Anderson et al. (2012)
find evidence that changes in the social stigma associated with declaring
bankruptcy play an important role in explaining the evolution of bankruptcy
rates over time.
Negative health outcomes may lead to lost income, through high medical
bills or foregone wages. These costs can potentially stress a household budget
2Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act Statistics, 2007; available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/bankruptcystatistics.aspx
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to the point of bankruptcy. There are also reasons to believe that low-income
households are particularly vulnerable to medical bankruptcy. Dranove and
Millenson (2006) found that about 17% of bankruptcies resulted from medical
bills, and that households driven to bankruptcy by medical bills were more
likely to be near the federal poverty level than other filers.
3.2 The Reform
In April of 2006, Massachusetts enacted a major health reform act with the
goal of achieving universal health insurance coverage within the state. The
law mandates that all Massachusetts residents must purchase health insur-
ance that meets a minimum standard of coverage if such coverage is afford-
able, or pay a non-compliance fee. Standards of affordability and coverage
are set forth by the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority.
Failure to purchase health insurance results in the loss of the personal ex-
emption to the income tax, which was $219 for an individual in 2007. In
2008, monthly penalties for not having insurance coverage were added, up to
half the the monthly cost of the least-expensive available plan.
The reform combines the individual mandate with an expansion of the Mas-
sachusetts Medicaid program, called “MassHealth,” and new subsidies for
individuals earning up to 300% of the federal poverty level. The MassHealth
expansion includes children in families earning up to 300% of the federal
poverty level and some low-income workers, and removes caseload caps on
people living with HIV, the long-term unemployed, and the disabled. The law
also restores vision and dental benefits that had been cut from MassHealth
in 2002. In addition to the expansion of MassHealth, a new program, “Com-
monwealth Care,” provides free insurance to families earning up to 150% of
the federal poverty level, and tiered subsidies for insurance for families earn-
ing up to 300% of the poverty level. MassHealth and Commonwealth Care
enrolled a combined 122,000 low-income residents within the first year of im-
plementation, approximately 100,000 of which were below the poverty level
(Raymond (2007)). In addition to offering low-income plans, the Connector
Authority offers special low-cost plans for young adults between the age of
19 and 26 and requires that private health insurance providers allow young
adults to remain on their parents’ plan for up to two years after they cease
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to be dependents.
The new law also requires employers to participate in providing health
care. All employers with over 10 employees are required to contribute to their
employees’ health insurance either by providing an insurance plan of their
own, or by paying at least 33% of their employees’ health insurance premium
costs. Employers who fail to do either must pay a “fair share” assessment
of up to $296 per uninsured employee. For residents not enrolled in a group
health plan, a new small-group market was created by merging the non-group
and small-group insurance markets. This reform permits such residents to
purchase insurance coverage from less expensive small-group plans. Raymond
(2007) and Gruber (2008) provide details on the health reform act.
3.3 The Effect of the Massachusetts Reform on
Insurance Coverage
The combination of personal mandate and insurance subsidies substantially
increased insurance coverage in Massachusetts. Figure 3.1 plots the unin-
surance rate in Massachusetts as well as the national uninsurance rate from
the Current Population Survey (CPS). Prior to the reform (2004-2006), the
uninsurance rate was about 10.3 percent in Massachusetts and about 15.3
percent nationally. Figure 3.1 plots data the Current Population Survey es-
timates of the uninsurance rate in Massachusetts and all other states from
1999 to 2009. From 1999 to 2006, the uninsurance rate in Massachusetts in-
creased modestly from about 9 to 10 percent, while the uninsurance rate in
the rest of the country increased from 14 to 15 percent. In 2007, the percent
uninsured in Massachusetts dropped dramatically, to about half its level or
5.5 percent. By 2009, the uninsurance rate in Massachusetts had fallen to
4.4 percent, but the national uninsurance rate had risen to 16.7 percent.
Because there was significant variation in insurance coverage at the county
level prior to the reform, the effect of the reform was not uniform across all
counties in Massachusetts. Figure 3.2 displays the uninsurance rate by county
in 2005, the year before the reform, using Census Bureau estimates of non-
elderly county-level uninsurance rate. Coverage ranges from over 90 percent
in the counties of Norfolk and Worcester to under 85 percent in Suffolk,
Dukes, and Nantucket.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage Uninsured in Massachusetts and the United States,
1999-2008
To formally estimate how the reform affected counties differentially ac-
cording to their pre-reform conditions, I estimate
Uninsuredit =α0 + α1MAi + α2Post t + α3Uninsured2005i (3.1)
+ α4Post t × Uninsured2005i + α5MAi × Uninsured2005i
+ α6Post t ×MAt + α7Post t ×MAi × Uninsured2005 t + it.
where Uninsuredit is the uninsurance rate in year t of Massachusetts county
i, the post-reform indicator Postt = 1 in 2008, the year after the reform was
fully implemented, and Uninsured2005i is the pre-reform uninsurance rate
in 2005. Here, the parameter α7 shows by what proportion the uninsurance
rate fell as a result of the reform from 2005 to 2008. I exclude the years 2006
and 2007 because the SAHIE constructs the uninsurance rate in year t using
the CPS from years t − 1, t, and t + 1. Therefore, this model captures the
change in insurance coverage from 2004-2006 to 2007-2009. If counties that
had higher uninsurance rates before the reform experienced the largest gains
in coverage, α3 should be negative and significant. For example, if everyone
who was uninsured before the reform gained insurance after the reform, α5
would equal −1.
Table 3.1 presents the estimates of equation (3.1). I find that counties with
higher uninsurance rates indeed experienced larger increases in coverage than
counties with lower insurance rates. Each percentage point increase in the
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Figure 3.2: Percent Uninsured by County in Massachusetts, 2005
Massachusetts by Insurance Coverage, 2005
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Table 3.1: Regression estimates of the effect of the reform on the
uninsurance rate
Dependent Variable: Uninsurance Rate
MA*Post*Uninsured2005 -0.50 (0.04)***
2005 Average: 0.13
Significance Levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. Source: See text.
pre-reform uninsurance rate resulted in a gain in coverage of 0.50 percentage
points. Results are similar with controls for county demographic character-
istics (percent black, median income, unemployment rate) are included in
the model. I conclude that the reform dramatically increased insurance cov-
erage, and this effect was proportionally larger in counties that had larger
uninsured populations before the reform.
3.4 The Effect of the Massachusetts Reform on
Personal Bankruptcy Rates
If insurance coverage reduces personal bankruptcy, personal bankruptcy rates
should fall in Massachusetts relative to other states, and this effect should
be most pronounced in counties that were most affected by the reform as
measured by their pre-reform uninsurance rate. In this section, I estimate
this effect by using cross-state and cross-county variation in the effect of the
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2006 health care reform.
I use county-level data on personal bankruptcy from the U.S. Department
of Justice on the number of total bankruptcies by chapter from 2006 to 2008.
These counts are based on the county of residence of the first named debtor
in the bankruptcy petition; debtors whose county of residence is outside of
the U.S. are excluded from the analysis. I divide the number of bankrupt-
cies by the total population of the state or county, as estimated by the U.S.
Census Bureau. For convenience, I multiply this figure by 1000 to obtain
the number of bankruptcies per 1000 residents. The county-level uninsur-
ance rate is taken from the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates provided
by the Census. These model-based estimates use health insurance coverage
data from the Current Population Survey, administrative Medicaid data, and
population demographics to estimate insurance coverage for all U.S. counties.
In some specifications, I employ further data on median income and poverty
rates by geographic area from the American Communities Survey, conducted
by the U.S. Census Bureau, as well as the unemployment rate from the Local
Area Unemployment Statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.3
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
dramatically altered the rules concerning bankruptcy filings. This reform
restricted bankruptcy in several ways. The law introduced a “means test”
that prevented families with income above the state median from declaring
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Additionally, it required that filers participate in
debt counseling and increased the fees associated with bankruptcy. This
reform had a substantial impact on the decision to file for bankruptcy, and
when to file for it, and the associated repercussions represent a potential
problem in identifying the effect of the Massachusetts reform one year later.
I take several steps to prevent the bankruptcy reform from confounding my
analysis. First, I restrict the sample period to only bankruptcies filed after
this reform was enacted; that is, I consider bankruptcies filed in the calendar
year of 2006 and later. The federal law applied uniformly to all states,
3The Bureau of Labor Statistics did not produce county-level unemployment
rate estimates for Louisiana in 2006, so counties in Louisiana are excluded
from analysis that uses the unemployment rate. Bankruptcy data are avail-
able for download at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx,
small area health insurance, income, and poverty estimates are available at
http://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ and http://www.census.gov//did/www/saipe/.
Local area unemployment statistics are found at http://www.bls.gov/lau/.
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but states that had relatively generous bankruptcy laws prior to the reform
may have been disproportionately affected (Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch
(2009)). Furthermore, because the Chapter 7 “means test” restricts Chapter
7 bankruptcy to only families making under the state median income, states
with different income distributions may have been affected differently by the
bankruptcy reform. To reduce the influence of these effects, I control for
state and county median income. I further evaluate the extent to which
the bankruptcy reform affects my results by evaluating the results using
comparison states with similar median income and exemption levels. The
results are largely unchanged across comparison groups.
My analysis compares changes in similar counties across states over time.
The assumption underlying this analysis is that, in the absence of the health
care reform, trends in personal bankruptcy would have evolved similarly
in high- and low-coverage counties in Massachusetts and other states. To
evaluate this assumption, I estimate
bankruptcyrateit = β0 + β1MAi + β2Uninsured2005i + β3PostBARt (3.2)
+ β4PostBARt × Uninsured2005i + β5PostBARi ×MAi
+ β6Uninsured2005i × PostBARt ×MAi
+
2008∑
t=2000
(βt1[Year = t] + βt2 × [Year = t]× Uninsured2005i
+ βt3MAt × [Year = t] + βt4MAt × Uninsured2005i
+ βt5Uninsured2005i ×MAt × [Year = t]) + it.
The coefficients on the three way interaction between the pre-reform uninsur-
ance rate, the year binary variables, and the Massachusetts indicator show
how personal bankruptcy rates evolved in high-uninsurance rate counties in
Massachusetts over time. To mitigate the effects of the 2005 bankruptcy
reform, I also include a three way interaction between a post-bankruptcy
abuse reform indicator (PostBAR), the 2005 uninsurance rate, and the Mas-
sachusetts indicator and all two-way interactions. Equation (3.2) therefore
measures the trends before bankruptcy reform and after the health reform
separately.
Figure 3.3 plots the coefficients on the three-way interaction Uninsured2005i×
MAt × [Year = t]) for 2000 to 2008 for the overall personal bankruptcy
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rate. Years 2005 and 2006 are excluded. I don’t find evidence of a trend in
bankruptcy rates specific to the high uninsurance counties in Massachusetts
prior to 2005. After the reform was implemented, I find a significant reduc-
tion in personal bankruptcies in 2007 and in Chapter 7 bankruptcies in 2007
and 2008. In contrast, I do not find a reduction in Chapter 13 bankrupt-
cies. I conclude there were no differential trends in personal bankruptcy rates
before 2005.
Figure 3.3: Pre-Reform Trends, 2000-2008
Dependent Variable in Caption (Per 1000 Residents)
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Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for regression estimates described
in equation (3.2). Data source: See text.
Using the approach implemented in the previous chapter, I model the per
capita bankruptcy rate in county i, in state j at year t (bankruptcyrateijt) as
a function of the 2006 county non-elderly uninsurance rate interacted with the
“post reform” indicator and an indicator that the county is in Massachusetts.
This approach is similar to the difference-in-difference-in-difference model
found in, e.g., Gruber (1994) and Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), but uses
a continuous measure of exposure to the reform (the 2005 uninsurance rate)
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as the “third” difference. I estimate
bankruptcyrateijt =γ0 + γ1 + γ2MAi + γ3Post t + γ4Uninsured2005ij (3.3)
+ γ5MAi × Uninsured2005ij
+ γ6Post t × Uninsured2005ij
+ γ7MAi × Post t × Uninsured2005ij + γ8Xijt + υit.
The coefficient γ7 captures the relationship between the increase in in-
surance coverage induced by the reform and the reduction in the personal
bankruptcy rate. If the increase in insurance coverage results in a reduction
in the personal bankruptcy rate, then γ7 is negative. In some models, I also
include controls for county characteristics, Xijt: the unemployment rate, the
2006 poverty rate and the 2006 median income. I fix a county’s poverty rate
and median income at its 2006 level to avoid endogenous changes in these
variables caused by the health reform itself. I also model the bankruptcy
rate separately by chapter.
Table 4 presents the estimates of (3.3). I find that the effect of the re-
form is significantly larger in counties that experienced a greater increase in
insurance coverage. A one percentage point increase in the pre-reform unin-
surance rate in Massachusetts corresponds to a reduction in total personal
bankruptcy rate of about 0.03 per 1000 residents (Columns 1 and 2).4 In the
full model, the estimate is significant at the 0.05 level; in the model without
controls it is not statistically significant.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.2 presents estimates with Chapter 7 bankrupt-
cies per 1000 residents as the dependent variable. Almost the entire estimated
reduction in personal bankruptcies is attributable to a reduction in Chapter
7 bankruptcies. In contrast, I do not find a change in Chapter 13 bankrupt-
cies. Chapter 7 bankruptcies are only available to debtors with income be-
low the state median. Households that undergo Chapter 7 bankruptcy have
lower median income than households that file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy;
for example, in 2007 in Massachusetts, the median income of a Chapter
13 bankruptcy filer was $55,212 per year, whereas the median income of a
4Estimates of models that include control variables exclude counties in Louisiana from
the control group, as county-level estimates of unemployment were not produced in 2006
due to disruptions caused by Hurricane Katrina.
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy filer was $27,888.5 The reform targeted at low-income
residents, and low-income residents experienced the largest increase in cov-
erage (Long et al. (2009)). Furthermore, debtors with incomes close to the
poverty line are more likely to experience bankruptcy as a result of medical
bills (Dranove and Millenson (2006)); it is these debtors who are likely to
have been most affected by the expansion of subsidized insurance coverage to
families under 300 percent of the Federal poverty line. It is therefore not sur-
prising that Chapter 7 bankruptcies experienced the largest reduction after
the health reform and that Chapter 13 bankruptcies were largely unaffected.
Under the assumption that the entire reduction in personal bankruptcy
is driven by an increase in insurance coverage, I can scale the estimates of
the change in bankruptcy by the change in insurance coverage estimated in
Section 4. I found that a one percentage point increase in the 2005 unin-
surance rate was associated with a gain in coverage of about one half of a
percentage point. Therefore the results presented in Table 3.2 are associated
with a “treatment effect” of insurance coverage on personal bankruptcy of
−0.003/.5 = −0.006, or a reduction in the probability of declaring bankruptcy
of 0.6 percentage points. The reform increased insurance coverage by at least
5 percentage points. Therefore my estimates suggest that, in the absence of
the reform, the personal bankruptcy rate in Massachusetts would have been
higher by between 0.006 ∗ 5 = 0.03 bankruptcies per 100 residents, or about
12 percent. This is large relative to the personal bankruptcy rate in the
population (about 4 in 1000 in 2005), but it likely reflects that low-income
residents were more likely to be affected by the reform, and their propensity
to declare bankruptcy is also more sensitive to insurance coverage than the
general population. This “local” treatment effect may therefore be larger
than the effect that would be estimated in the general population.
3.4.1 Concurrent Macroeconomic Improvement
Results estimated with the difference-in-difference-in-difference model in equa-
tion (3.3) are robust to Massachusetts-specific shocks to the personal bankruptcy
rate as well as shocks to most-affected counties, but they would not be ro-
bust to shocks that only occur in counties with high uninsurance rates within
5Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act Statistics, 2007; available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/bankruptcystatistics.aspx
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Massachusetts (for example, an increase in local demand for employment).
To investigate whether the reduction in personal bankruptcy rates in these
counties could reflect a concurrent improvement in the economic climate,
rather than the health care reform, I estimate equation (3.3) again twice:
with the the county-level business bankruptcy rate as the dependent variable
as in Gross and Notowidigdo (2010) and with the county-level unemployment
rate.
Table 3.3 presents the results. In both instances, I do not find a statisti-
cally significant improvement in either economic indicator in Massachusetts
counties relative to similar counties in other states. This result suggests that
my findings are not driven by a coinciding improvement economic condi-
tions that also improved the personal bankruptcy rate. This result supports
the hypothesis that the health reform caused a reduction in the personal
bankruptcy rate in these counties, and is not merely correlated with a reduc-
tion in the personal bankruptcy rate.
3.4.2 Alternative Control Groups and the 2005 Bankruptcy
Abuse Reform Act
The results presented above compare the growth in personal bankruptcy rates
of the most-affected counties in Massachusetts with similar counties in other
states. In this section, I re-estimate the models using different comparison
states to confirm that my results are not sensitive to which states are included
in the control group.
I first use alternative control states to address the possible impact of the
2005 bankruptcy reform act on the results. Because Massachusetts had rela-
tive generous home exemption laws prior to the bankruptcy reform act, the
restrictions introduced by the law may have affected Massachusetts differ-
ently from other states. To test this assumption, I re-estimate the model
3.3 using states with similar home exemptions as a control group. Table 3.4
reports the results.
In 2005, the home exemption in Massachusetts was $500,000. Columns 1
through 3 report the effect of the reform using states with similarly generous,
but finite, exemptions - Nevada (that has a home exemption of $350,000),
Rhode Island ($200,000), and Minnesota ($200,000). Columns 4 through 6
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add comparison states with an unlimited home exemption (Arkansas, D.C.,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Texas). Both groups
of comparison states find that the health reform reduced personal bankrupt-
cies by between 0.04 to 0.08 bankruptcies per 1000 residents, slightly larger
than the reduction of 0.03 found in the previous section. When estimated
separately by chapter, I confirm that the reduction in total bankruptcies is
largely driven by a reduction in Chapter 7 bankruptcies that are available
only to debtors with household income below the state median.
The 2005 reform also restricted Chapter 7 bankruptcy using a “means
test” based on state median income. Although I include state median in-
come as a control in the model, the bankruptcy law may have altered the
trend in states differently based on their income distribution. To account
for this potential effect, I estimate the model 3.3 but limit the sample to
only states with median incomes similar to that in Massachusetts at the
time of the bankruptcy reform. The second panel of Table 3.4 presents the
results. Median income in Massachusetts in 2005 was $48,775 for an in-
dividual. In Columns 1-3 I include only states with 2005 median income
closest to Massachusetts - Maryland (median income for the individual of
$48,205) and Hawaii ($47,056). Columns 4-6 extend the comparison group
to include Alaska ($45,191), Virginia ($43,195), Washington ($43,891), Illi-
nois ($43,012), California ($43,436) and New Hampshire ($52,120). Using
these comparison groups, I find that a one percentage point increase in the
pre-reform uninsurance rate results in a reduction in personal bankruptcies
of between 0.04 and 0.08 per 1000 residents. I also find significant changes
in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, but no change in Chapter 13 bankruptcies.
Finally, it may be preferable to limit the sample to states within the same
region if region-specific economic shocks affect bankruptcy. The final panel
of Table 3.4 presents estimates of equation (3.3) using other states in the
Northeast census region (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine) for comparison. I find
similar results using the Northeast region states as a comparison as in the
other specifications.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides the first estimates of the effect of comprehensive health
care reform on personal bankruptcy rates. In 2006, Massachusetts undertook
a major health care reform whose goal was to achieve universal insurance cov-
erage within the state. I use the variation generated by pre-reform conditions
at the county level to identify the impact of this reform on the bankruptcy
rate.
I find that bankruptcy rates would have been approximately 12% higher
had the reform not occurred. The reduction is largest in counties that ex-
perienced the greatest increase in insurance coverage. The reduction in per-
sonal bankruptcies is driven almost exclusively by a reduction in Chapter 7
bankruptcies that are most often filed by lower income households. I find no
concurrent improvement for the business bankruptcy rate or the unemploy-
ment rate, indicating that the reduction in personal bankruptcies is a result
of the health care reform rather than a coinciding improvement economic
conditions.
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Table 3.3: Regression estimates of concurrent macroeconomic improvement
in Massachusetts
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Rate Business Bankruptcies per Capita
Post*MA* % Uninsured 2005 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Controls?* No Yes No Yes
No. obs: 12292 12292 12292 12292
Standard Errors Clustered by County; Significance Levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%.
*Controls included are: 2006 poverty rate, 2006 median county income in $1000s, state median income used
for Chapter 7 “means test” for 2006 bankruptcies.
Excludes Louisiana counties.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION AND DEFAULT IN
CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETS:
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT
Information is widely considered a crucial component of well-functioning
credit markets. Active screening of loan applicants redirects funds towards
borrowers who are more likely to repay and reduces the private and social
costs of default. Without sufficient information, lenders cannot properly per-
form such screening. Yet despite its importance, relatively little empirical
work exists on the impact of lender information on loan outcomes. Infor-
mation provision is costly, but there is no evidence of its effect on loan per-
formance, making it difficult to assess whether credit markets should invest
in information provision or, e.g., contract enforcement. This study provides
such evidence by using a natural experiment to document the causal effect
of lender information on loan default probability, lender return, and recovery
rate.
Although information frictions have been thoroughly explored in theory,1
plausibly estimating of the effect of information on credit market outcomes
is not straightforward. Data on which credit-worthiness metrics a lender
uses when making an investment decision are not readily available. Even
if such data existed, the amount of information a lender chooses to use is
likely endogenous to loan performance. Information acquisition is costly and
lenders who are best able to apply information are more likely to inform
themselves. Simply contrasting the default behavior of loans made by well-
informed lenders and those made by less-informed lenders may reveal more
about the lender than the role of information.2
My analysis avoids these issues by exploiting an unanticipated, dramatic
increase in borrower credit report details visible to lenders on Prosper.com,
a peer-to-peer lending website. At its launch in February of 2006, lenders
1See, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), De Meza and Webb (1987), Jaffee and Russell
(1976).
2For example, Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009) find that investors with
higher IQs earn superior returns
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were only able to see very coarse information on a potential borrower’s credit
worthiness, specifically the borrower’s debt to income ratio and a range of
their credit score. On April 18, 2006, the website added several additional
credit metrics, including the number of current delinquent accounts, past
bankruptcies, credit inquiries and homeownership status. Using a regression
discontinuity (RD) design and conditioning on information available in both
the pre- and post-policy change periods, I find that allowing lenders access
to this new credit history data made lenders more selective among high risk
borrowers. The change in the information policy caused the average prob-
ability of default to decrease by approximately 9.9 percentage points. The
reduction in the default rate was driven almost exclusively by high risk loans,
whose default probability decreased by between 13 and 20 percentage points.
This reduction in the default rate represents a decrease of over 30% from
the pre-policy default level. Moreover, I find that those loans made after the
policy change that did default have higher recovery rates.
I use data on the credit scores of potential borrowers that were unobserved
by lenders both before and after the policy change to evaluate whether selec-
tion by loan applicants can explain these results. While I do not find that the
new information deterred (unobservably) high risk borrowers from applying
for loans, I find some evidence that lenders were better at choosing the low
risk borrowers from among the applicant pool. These results imply that the
new information reduced default rates by improving lender screening rather
than inducing selection among loan applicants.
Immediate lender returns increased by about 12 percentage points after the
information shock. After about 6 weeks, returns decayed to pre-information
shock levels, providing a measure of the amount of time required for the
market to internalize the new information and compete away the increase
in expected profits. This increase in returns was driven entirely by an im-
provement in lenders’ ability to filter out potential defaulters and returns to
non-defaulting loans did not change over this period. These results are ro-
bust to alternative model specifications and windows around the event, and
simulations indicate that effects of this magnitude are unlikely to be due to
chance.
This analysis demonstrates that information can be used to limit costly
default by improving lender filtering. I find that giving even a limited amount
of information to relatively unsophisticated investors results in a dramatically
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lower default rate. Furthermore, my results indicate that information is
especially crucial in credit markets catering to high risk borrowers.
4.1 Information and Loan Outcomes
The negative effects of information frictions on borrower default have been
explored extensively in theory (see, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Broecker
(1990), Jaffee and Russell (1976)). When it is difficult to distinguish between
borrowers of different quality, lenders may over- (De Meza and Webb (1987))
or under- (Mankiw (1986)) invest relative to the optimum. In some models,
information problems lead to the market unraveling entirely as only borrowers
of unobserved low quality self-select in to loans (as in Akerlof (1986)).
Some recent studies document the existence of asymmetric information
problems in consumer credit markets and measured the extent to which they
are disruptive. Karlan and Zinman (2010) use a unique credit market field
experiment in South Africa and estimate that between 7% and 16% of the de-
faults in their sample are due to asymmetric information. Using transaction-
level data on car loans in a sub-prime lending environment, Adams, Einav,
and Levin (2009) also find evidence that information frictions cause serious
distortions. Using the information contained in the borrower’s down payment
decision, the authors find that loan size both causes higher defaults (moral
hazard) and that borrowers with private information select in to larger loans
(adverse selection), resulting in a non-monotonic relationship between loan
size and expected loan payment. Similarly, Edelberg (2004) finds a strong
association between the interest rate a borrower is willing to pay and the
probability that borrower defaults, conditional on several observable bor-
rower characteristics.
Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2009) explore how the introduction of the new
information technology of credit scoring affects lending outcomes using data
on a market for subprime car loans. Prior to the adoption of this technology,
dealers determined loan terms in an ad hoc manner, basing decisions on
information about a potential borrower’s income and work status elicited in
personal interviews. After the technological change, a formal credit scoring
algorithm was used to screen and to assign loan terms to potential borrowers.
The authors find that this change in business practice resulted in an increase
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in profit of about $1000 per loan.
Rather than documenting the existence of information frictions, I focus
on estimating how increasing the information set of lenders improves loan
outcomes. My analysis provides a measure of how important information
provision is for lender screening. In doing so, I am able to highlight the con-
sequences of financial markets in which lenders have access to only limited
information. The results presented in this paper are particularly relevant to
sub-prime lending contexts where screening is critical, as the one explored in
Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) and Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2009). In
contrast to Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2009), however, my analysis focuses
explicitly on how superior information, rather than a new technology or busi-
ness practice, affects lender filtering. A significant advantage of using data
from Prosper is that I have full knowledge of the exact financial information
available to lenders before and after the policy change, so that I can condi-
tion on the coarser information. Furthermore, the only change in the lending
environment was the amount of information visible; all other institutional
features of borrowing and lending in this context are held constant, allowing
for a clean identification of the effect of information provision alone.
4.2 The Prosper Marketplace
This paper uses data on loans made during 2006 on the lending website
Prosper.com. Prosper is an online marketplace that connects borrowers and
lenders in a “peer-to-peer” setting. Potential borrowers post loan requests,
called “listings,” with a short description of why they need the loan, a photo,
and the maximum interest rate they are willing to pay. Prosper pulls bor-
rower credit history data from a credit rating agency and posts this informa-
tion alongside the loan request. The broadest measure of credit risk posted
by Prosper is “credit grade,” a binning mechanism that groups borrowers by
credit score (see Table 4.1).
Thousands of listings are open at any time. Lenders examine listings and
choose which listings to invest in and how much to invest. They are not
required to invest in the full amount: lenders can bid as little as $50. If
enough lenders choose to invest, such that the amount of money offered
exceeds the size of the loan, the interest rate is bid down competitively.
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After seven to ten days, if the entire amount of the loan has been invested,
the interest rate of the marginal losing bidder becomes the interest rate on the
loan and Prosper facilitates a bank transfer. If the potential borrower cannot
attract enough investment after this period, the listing is canceled and no
money changes hands. As of early 2010, Prosper has facilitated about $191
million worth of loans since its launch on February 13, 2006.
All Prosper loans are three-year, fully amortized, un-collateralized loans,
making them particularly well-suited for the study of consumer default, as all
loan terms are fixed except for loan size and interest rate. Prosper makes data
on all listings, loans, and loan repayment histories available to the public.
I use the complete history of loan repayments to calculate the internal rate
of return on each loan and I follow Prosper’s definition in considering loans
more than 121 days past due to be in default.
Prosper attracts many low quality borrowers who pay high interest rates
but also have a high probability of default. The distribution of returns is
bimodal. Loans that do not default earn a high rate of return, but those
that do default earn an average rate of return around −65%. It follows that
earning a positive return on Prosper relies heavily on the ability of lenders to
avoid borrowers who will default. Figure 4.1 presents a histogram of returns.
Figure 4.1: Histogram of Lender Returns on Prosper For All Loans
Originating in 2006
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Author’s own calculations based on loan performance data downloaded from
http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010.
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Although Prosper loans earned a negative rate of return on average in 2006,
for most credit grades average returns are comparable or better than the
returns on traditional assets such as the S&P 500 (see Table 4.1). Negative
returns are not surprising as the U.S. experienced a severe recession in 2008
and 2009 while these loans were being repaid. Prosper loans dramatically out-
performed some widely-traded investment vehicles in the period of analysis,
such as the Wilshire 5000. The performance difference is especially sharp
for borrowers with better credit scores. Default rates on Prosper are high,
around 35%, but comparable to other subprime lending contexts; see, for
example, Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2009) and Einav, Jenkins, and Levin
(2010).
Table 4.1: Loans by Credit Grade for Loans Originating in 2006
Grade Credit Score Average Return % of Total % of Loan Default Rate
Range Loan Volume Requests
AA 760+ 3.90 12.13 2.35 0.10
A 720− 759 −0.36 12.73 2.07 0.17
B 680− 719 −1.85 15.16 2.95 0.25
C 640− 679 −4.25 17.98 5.41 0.32
D 600− 639 −5.75 15.96 8.11 0.36
E 540− 599 −17.87 14.67 18.85 0.49
HR Below 540 −37.00 10.47 58.27 0.66
NC No Credit History −46.59 0.88 1.98 0.73
S&P 500∗ – −12.2 – – –
Wilshire 5000∗ – −36.5 – – –
Author’s own calculations based on data downloaded from
http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010.
*3 year return based on prices beginning when Prosper launched, February 2006
Other analyses using data from Prosper.com focus on lenders’ use of in-
formation from non-traditional sources, “soft” information, and personal ex-
periences.3 My analysis complements this literature by controlling for “soft”
information as best as possible, while focusing on how an exogenous change
in available “hard,” financial information impacts loan outcomes such as de-
fault. While these papers explore the roles of distinctive Prosper features,
such as online photographs and social groups, this paper aims to answer a
more general question: how much does lender information improve loan out-
3For example, Ravina (2008), Pope and Sydnor (2009) and Duarte, Siegel, and Young
(2009) examine how the photo used by borrowers in their loan request influences loan
terms and find evidence of taste-based discrimination. Freedman and Jin (2009) focus on
the impact of Prosper online social groups on borrower outcomes such as interest rate,
funding probability and loan performance.
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comes? The extent to which Prosper lenders are unsophisticated or incapable
of fully utilizing the new information results in estimates of a smaller mag-
nitude than would be expected were this experiment performed in a general
population. Although this experiment on Prosper is a specific example, my
results underline the consequences of poor information in other sub-prime
lending contexts.
Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, and Shue (2009) examine how well lenders on
Prosper use information, both traditional and non-traditional, to infer a bor-
rowers’ actual credit scores, since only credit grades are posted on Prosper.
The authors restrict their data set to the period after all information changes
have been made. While the authors use credit score as a proxy for ex ante
credit worthiness, my analysis focuses on ex-post results, relying on the ex-
ogeneity of the information shock for identification. While Iyer, Khwaja,
Luttmer, and Shue (2009) find that investors can use the information to
make reasonable ex-ante decisions, I take a different approach and focus on
the ability of information to improve realized outcomes.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
On April 18, 2006, Prosper made an unannounced change in the amount
of information that it provided about loan applicants. At its launch to the
public, lenders only had access to coarse data on a potential borrower’s credit-
worthiness: debt to income ratio and credit score range, called “credit grade,”
but nothing more. Beginning April 18, 2006, Prosper allowed lenders to
access data on a loan applicant’s homeownership status, number of current
and past delinquent accounts, number of public records (such as bankruptcies
or liens) in the last 10 years, credit inquiries, total number of credit lines in
the borrower’s name, and the first date of credit activity on the borrower’s
credit report, in addition to the previously available credit grade and debt
to income ratio.4 Table 4.2 summarizes the information available before and
4A second policy change, on February 12, 2007, added data on public records in the last
12 months, delinquencies in the last 7 years, open and current credit lines, revolving credit
balance, and bankcard utilization. This policy change also redefined the “HR” and “E”
categories and excluded all borrowers from applying whose credit scores were below 540.
I estimate that this policy change also led to a small reduction in the default probability,
but it is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The second policy change also caused
a similarly imprecisely measured increase in lender returns. My analysis focuses on the
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after the policy change.
Table 4.2: Information Policy History
Before April 18, 2006 Added April 18, 2006
Credit Grade Homeownership Status
Debt to Income Ratio Current Delinquences
Delinquences Last 7 Yrs
Public Records Last 10 Yrs
Credit Inquiries
Total Credit Lines
First Credit Activity (Date)
Figure 4.2 demonstrates graphically the effect of the policy change on
investor returns. The vertical line indicates the date on which the new infor-
mation was revealed to lenders. Returns on loans made in 2006 are smoothed
before and after the policy change and plotted against time. A large jump
in investor returns appears on the day of the policy change and decays over
time. Similarly, default rates, smoothed before and after the policy change,
are plotted against time in Figure 4.3. The solid line in Figure 4.3 is the de-
fault rate on high risk loans, those with credit grades below “C.” The figure
illustrates how the default rate on loans made to borrowers with low credit-
worthiness drops immediately following the revelation of new information.
There is no obvious change in the default rate for low risk loans, displayed
as a dashed line.
To estimate the effect of the policy change on loan performance, I compare
loans made immediately before and after the new information became avail-
able. If loans made around the cutoff date are sufficiently similar, then the
discontinuity in the default rate at the day the new information was provided
can be ascribed to the policy change. By controlling for information available
in both periods, I effectively compare the default rate of loans that would
have appeared identical to lenders if the policy change had not occurred.
This technique assumes that loans made directly before and after the policy
change do not differ in some unobserved way other than the information
first policy change, as it represented a larger increase in the available amount of data
available to lenders both in absolute terms and relative to the pre-treatment period, and
because the redefinition of credit grades makes direct comparisons between the pre- and
post- periods difficult for the second policy change.
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Figure 4.2: Smoothed Returns (Solid) and Loan Volume in $1000s
(Dashed) for 2006
Vertical Line Indicates Policy Change
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http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010. Data smoothed seperately in
before and after periods using a uniform kernel.
available at the time of the loan. However, there is some concern that this
assumption is violated: the volume of loans on Prosper grew quickly during
2006 (see Figure 4.2, the dashed line indicates loan volume), and changing
macroeconomic conditions may have resulted in different types of borrowers
being attracted to Prosper over time. Lenders may also be learning about
which types of loans are most profitable. To minimize the impact of these
possibly confounding time trends, I estimate the effect at successively smaller
windows around the policy change. This approach is similar to studies that
exploit geographic discontinuities at political borders, e.g., Holmes (1998),
and assumes that the effect of the time trend is approximately flat in a small
neighborhood around the cutoff date. An alternative approach is to control
for the time trend parametrically. I apply this regression discontinuity (RD)
technique in addition to the cutoff comparison. Both approaches yield similar
results.
In addition to accounting for time trends, I also carefully evaluate whether
the policy itself may have altered the composition of Prosper borrowers and
lenders. For example, low-quality loan applicants might have been “scared
off” by lenders’ new access to information and not bothered to apply. The
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Figure 4.3: Smoothed Default Rate For High Risk (Solid) and Low Risk
(Dashed)
Loans Originating in 2006. Vertical Line Indicates Policy Change
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Author’s own calculations based on loan performance data downloaded from
http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010. Data smoothed separately in
before and after periods using a uniform kernel.
reduction in the default rate might therefore be driven by a higher quality
pool of potential borrowers rather than more informed decision-making. To
evaluate the role of applicant selection, I use data on loan applicants’ credit
scores that were unavailable to lenders in both periods. This allows me to
directly evaluate borrower selection on unobserved credit quality. Similarly,
I mitigate the effects of lender selection by limiting my sample to loans that
have at least one bid from a lender that was active prior to the information
policy change.
The data displayed on a borrower’s loan request are generated at the time
of the listing, so all listings posted before the policy change do not include the
new information. Prosper did not update the information on current listings
after the policy change, but borrowers were able to withdraw their loan
request and repost it at any time. Since high quality borrowers have a greater
incentive to provide lenders more information, selection into the treatment
group may bias estimates. I control for this behavior in my analysis by
“reassigning” to their original posting date loan requests that were withdrawn
following the policy change and reposted. In this way, I effectively prevent
borrowers from self-selecting into the treatment group in my data set.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Borrower Default
Lenders use information to screen potential borrowers in order to avoid costly
delinquencies and defaults. If lender screening is an effective filtering tool,
permitting lenders to access more information lowers default rates. To mea-
sure the magnitude of this effect, I use a probit model to estimate the impact
of the policy change on default probability. Let di denote default, such that
di = 1 if loan i defaults, di = 0 otherwise. I estimate the probit model
P (di = 1) = Φ(α0 + f(t) + Post i × f(t) + α1Post i + α>2 Xi (4.1)
+ α>3 Zi + i).
The variable Posti equals 1 if loan i was made on or after April 18, 2006 and 0
otherwise. Xi includes the borrower information available in both periods: a
borrower’s credit grade and debt to income ratio, a binary variable indicating
whether or not the borrower has posted a photograph, and information on
any Prosper social groups to which the borrower belongs. I control for size
of the loan and interest rate, denoted Zi. In some specifications, I include
a third order polynomial to control for time trends that are present before
and after the policy change, denoted here as f(t) and Posti ∗ f(t). The
coefficient on the post-policy indicator, α1, measures the impact of the new
information. If α1 is negative, then the information provision reduced average
default rates. Because I control for information available in both periods, I
am essentially evaluating the performance of loans that would have appeared
identical if there had not been a change in the information policy.
Table 4.3 presents the estimated coefficients of (4.1). I find that the pol-
icy change significantly improved investors’ ability to screen out borrowers
who are likely to default. When I compare loans made two weeks before
the policy change with similar loans made two weeks after, I find that the
predicted probability of default is 9.9 percentage points lower after the new
borrower information was made available. Average default probability in the
two weeks prior to the policy change is about 0.34, so the change in the infor-
mation policy reduced default rates by about 29% relative to the pre-reform
level. This effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. I successively
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tighten the window of time around the policy change from two weeks, to
ten days (Columns 3 and 4), to one week (Columns 5 and 6). I estimate
reductions in the default rate of between 9.0 and 9.4 percentage points, sim-
ilar in magnitude to the the 9.9 percentage point reduction estimated in the
two week sample. Because of the reduced sample size, these effects are only
marginally significant. Finally, I use data from all of 2006, but control for the
time trend using a third degree polynomial. I estimate a slightly larger effect
- a reduction in default probability of 10.2 percentage points - but it is not
statistically significant. Taken together these results suggest that the reform
reduced the default rate by between 9 and 10 percentage points, although
statistical significance is inconsistent.
Model (4.1) examines the average effect of the reform among all types
of loans. However, information may be most useful in screening high risk
borrowers. High risk borrowers may be more heterogeneous, as there are
many ways to be “bad” – i.e., earn a low credit rating – but only few ways
to be “good.” Indeed, Figure 4.3 suggests that the reform had a substantial
impact on high risk borrowers and almost no impact on low risk borrowers.
To examine how the information affected different types of loans, I construct
the variable LowRisk = 1 if the borrower has credit grade AA, A, or B. This
variable takes a value of zero if a borrower has low credit-worthiness, i.e.,
credit grades C, D, E, HR and NC. I estimate
P (di = 1) = Φ(α0 + f(t) + Post i × f(t) + LowRisk i × f(t) (4.2)
+ Post i × LowRisk i × f(t) + α1Post i + α2LowRisk i
+ α3Post i × LowRisk i + α>4 Xi + α>5 Zi + i),
where Xi denotes all borrower characteristics excluding credit grade, the
effect of which is partially captured by the binary variable “LowRisk,” and
Zi denotes the terms of the loan. I control for the time trend with a third
degree polynomial and allow this trend to differ between low and high risk
loans both before and after the policy change. The coefficient α1 describes
the effect of the information revelation on the probability of default for high
risk loans, while α3 measures the average difference of the effect between high
and low risk loans.
Table 4.4 presents the results. Allowing lenders to access more information
about borrowers lowered the probability of default on high risk loans by a
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substantial 12.7 percentage points. This estimate is statistically significant
at the 0.05 level. For low risk loans, the model estimates a small reduction
in default probability (about 2 percentage points), but it is not statistically
significant. When the sample is limited to only loans originating within
ten days or one week of the information policy change, I estimate that the
probability of default for high risk loans decreased by 17 to 14 percentage
points, respectively. I again find no significant effect for low risk loans in
these models. Columns 7 and 8 report estimates that use data from all
of 2006 but include controls for the time trend. Using this technique, I
find that the new information reduced default probability among highrisk
loans by approximately 20 percentage points. These results indicate that the
information revealed was most useful in screening applicants of low observable
credit-worthiness and suggest that lenders became more selective among high
risk applicants as a result of the policy change.
My main specification reduces the sample to loans made within two weeks
of the information policy change to prevent changes in the macroeconomic
environment and other confounding factors from contaminating the results.
Considering only loans made around the cutoff date limits the impact of time
trends on my results, but requires a relatively small sample in a market that
displays significant volatility. A possible concern is that wide fluctuations
in the market could result in several random decreases in default probabil-
ity, none of them linked to underlying changes in the market information
structure. Possibly one such fluctuation occurred on the same day as the
information policy change, resulting in an estimated treatment effect that is
the product of pure chance.
To evaluate the plausibility that such randomness underlies the results
detailed above, I repeat my analysis of average default probability using
every four week period beginning at the launch of the Prosper website on
February 13th, 2006, and incrementing daily throughout all of 2006. I place
an artificial “break” at the center of every four week period in the sample and
estimated the default probability model as if a policy change had occurred at
that break. I find that the effect measured at the true policy change date was
the third largest drop in conditional default rates among the 319 simulations.
The probability of observing a drop in default rates of that magnitude is less
than 1 percent. Figure 4.4 displays the empirical cumulative distribution
function of all estimated coefficients in the default regression model, with
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a vertical line indicating the effect measured at the true policy break point.
These simulations suggest that it is highly unlikely for my results to be driven
by chance.
Figure 4.4: Kernel Density of Simulated “Treatment Effects,” Default
Model
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4.4.2 Recovery Rates
The new information provided to lenders allowed them to better avoid bor-
rowers who default very shortly after receiving funds. As a consequence,
recovery rates on loans that did default in the post-reform period are higher.
Figure 4.5 compares the empirical distribution functions of the timing of
default for defaulting loans from both the pre-information (solid) and post-
information (dashed) periods. The horizontal axis represents the number of
days from loan origination until delinquency and the vertical axis is the es-
timated density. The distribution of default timing among loans made after
the new information became available almost perfectly stochastically dom-
inates that of the pre-information distribution. That is, the loans that did
default in the post-information period were more likely to default later, and
thus have higher recovery rates.
I use a linear model to measure the impact of the policy change on the
timing of delinquency for defaulted loans. Let yi denote days until default of
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loan i. Then, using a sample of only defaulted loans, I estimate
yi = γ0 + f(t) + Post i × f(t) + γ1Post i + γ>3 Xi + γ>4 Zi + ei (4.3)
where Xi again denotes borrower characteristics known in both pre-and post-
policy change periods and Zi are the terms of loan i. The coefficient γ1
measures the impact of the policy change.
I find that defaulting loans from the pre-information period stopped paying
earlier than those from the post-information period. Looking only at the
subset of loans that default, borrowers who received loans in the two weeks
after the information policy change made payments on their loans for an
average of 444 days before becoming delinquent, as compared to the pre-
reform borrowers, who paid 366 days on average before delinquency.
Table 4.5 presents estimates of the impact of the new information on de-
fault timing conditional on borrower characteristics and loan terms. When
these variables are controlled for, the effect of having additional informa-
tion increased the average number of days before default by 113 on average,
representing almost four additional payments. This result is marginally sig-
nificant at the 0.10 level and is based on the 108 loans that defaulted within
two weeks of the information policy change. When I use loans from all of
2006 and account but the time trend parametrically, I find that delinquent
loans made after the policy change defaulted later by 170 days, or about five
additional payments. This effect is significant at the 0.05 level. Because of
the small sample sizes, I do not estimate effects at smaller windows around
the cutoff date.
These results suggests that lenders are able to not only filter out default-
ers, but that accessing information also allows them to avoid borrowers who
essentially “take the money and run.” As a result, loans that did default
defaulted later. The superior information available after the policy change
not only allowed lenders to filter out borrowers who default, it also improved
recovery rates.
4.4.3 Lender Returns
Allowing lenders to access more information reduced the delinquency rate
significantly. Loans that default earn on average a return of about −65%,
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Figure 4.5: Empirical Cumulative Probability Distribution of Default
Among Defaulted Loans Only
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Data downloaded from http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010.
so the ability to avoid defaulting borrowers is necessary for lenders to earn
profits on average. In a perfectly competitive market, the increase in ex-
pected profit resulting from a lower default risk might have been immedi-
ately competed away. However, on Prosper, the information policy change
initially increased average returns substantially, indicating that it took time
for lenders to compete away the associated rents.
Unconditional average lender returns over the two week period prior to
the policy change were −14%. After this policy change, the unconditional
average rose to about −3%. Over time, returns decline (see Figure 4.2) to
their pre-information shock levels, although whether these changes are due
to increased competition, negative shocks to the lending environment, or
declining borrower quality cannot be established.
To measure the impact of this information on immediate lender returns
conditional on information common in both periods, I model returns as a
linear function of borrower characteristics, loan terms, and an indicator for
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the loan being made after the policy change. That is,
yi = γ0 + f(t) + Post i × f(t) + γ1Post i + γ>3 Xi + γ>4 Zi + ei. (4.4)
Table 4.6 presents the results of this model, using data from within two
weeks of the policy change, in column 1. Once I condition on common infor-
mation, I estimate that allowing lenders access to more information about
borrowers initially increased average returns by about 12 percentage points.
This result is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. When the sample size
is reduced to loans made within ten days to one week of the policy change, the
estimated coefficient on the policy dummy is between 13.4 and 12.7. These
effects are significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. This increase
in lender returns comes entirely from lenders’ improved ability to avoid bor-
rowers who might default. Column 5 of Table 4.6 presents the returns model
estimated with a subset of the sample including only loans that did not de-
fault. Results indicate that returns on non-defaulting loans did not change
significantly after the information shock, suggesting that the entire gain in
lender returns is derived from their improved screening ability. These results
suggest that the Prosper market did not immediately assimilate the new in-
formation and that lenders temporarily enjoyed the benefit of the reduced
default rate in the form of higher expected profits.
The results of a regression with interest rate as the dependent variable are
presented in Table 4.7. The effect of the policy on interest rates is estimated
to be small, about 0.001, and statistically insignificant. The fact that infor-
mation policy change had no immediate effect on interest rates is consistent
with the interpretation that the market did not immediately respond to the
profits associated with better information. Another measure of the compet-
itiveness of the Prosper market, number of bids per loan, also appears to
be unchanged immediately after the policy breaks. For example, a regres-
sion of the number of bids on borrower and loan characteristics does not
find that the policy shocks significantly increased or decreased the number
of lenders competing over each loan on average; these results are found in
Table 4.7. When the borrower characteristics and the policy break indicator
are interacted, there is weak evidence that the premium paid by the highest
risk types increased after the first information policy change, but this is only
marginally significant. No such grade-specific changes in number of bids per
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loan are found.
The increase in lender returns and the lack of adjustment in bids per loan
or interest rate show that the shock to expected profit caused by the pol-
icy change was not immediately internalized by the market. Higher realized
returns persisted for approximately 40 days, before post-reform period re-
turns were statistically indistinguishable from pre-reform returns. For each
two week period following the return, a regression was estimated with re-
turn as the dependent variable and controls for borrower characteristics and
an indicator for “post reform” as explanatory variables. Figure 4.6 plots
the coefficient on the indicator variable for “post” return estimated with the
comparison group varying from the two week period immediately following
the information policy reform and incrementing daily for 50 days with 95%
confidence intervals.
As in the default probability model, there is a concern that results of
this magnitude may be common in a market where lender returns exhibit
significant fluctuation. There might be multiple “break points” at which a
large increase in investor returns would be estimated even without any true
change in the Prosper market. To determine how common it is to estimate
effects of this size, I performed an analogous exercise to that in the default
section. I place the artificial “policy break point” at the center of each
four week window and estimated the default model presented in equation
(4.4). Figure 4.7 presents the empirical distribution function of the simulated
estimate effects. I find that the coefficient on the indicator for true policy
effect is the maximum of all 319 estimated coefficients, confirming that even
in a turbulent market, it is implausible for an increase in lender returns of
this magnitude to occur by chance.
4.4.4 Loan Applicant Quality, Project Composition, and
Funding Probability
In the previous sections, I found that providing lenders with better informa-
tion about loan applicant quality resulted in lower default rates, especially
among high risk loans. This section analyzes how the new information af-
fected the composition of loan applicants and the probability these applicants
would receive funding, and explores to what extent, if any, the estimated re-
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Figure 4.6: Estimated Treatment Effect for the Change in Information
Policy over Time
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
15
20
25
Days Since Policy Change
Ef
fe
ct
Estimated treatment effect of information policy plotted with 95% confidence intervals. Difference in
average returns of two week period prior to the reform with average returns of two week period starting
the number of days after the reform given on the x-axis, conditional on borrower characteristics available
in both the pre- and post-reform periods.
duction in the default rate is driven by selection among loan applicants.
Table 4.8 presents the proportion of loan applicants by credit grade in the
pre- and post-reform periods, with stars indicating a statistically significant
difference. Using data on all loan requests made within two weeks of the
information policy change, I find that there is a substantial decline, rather
than increase, in the observable quality of loan applications. The fraction of
low risk borrowers applying for loans, those with credit grade “AA,” “A,” or
“B,” fell significantly after the policy change, and the fraction of high risk
“HR” borrowers rose substantially.
Although observable borrower quality did not increase, the quality of bor-
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Figure 4.7: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of Simulated
“Treatment Effects,” Returns Model
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rowers may be increasing in ways the lenders do not observe. Within a
given credit grade, the reform may have discouraged higher risk borrowers
who knew they would be revealed as low quality conditional on their credit
grade. Similarly, providing new information to lenders may have encouraged
(conditionally) higher quality applicants to post. I am able to evaluate this
effect using data that was unobserved by lenders in both periods and known
only to borrowers. Specifically, I use more precise information on borrower
credit scores than was unavailable to lenders both before and after the pol-
icy change. While lenders saw only the credit “grade”, a 40+-point range of
the credit score (see Table 4.1), proprietary data from the website provides
20-point credit score ranges. This finer measure of credit score allows me to
assign borrowers to the upper and lower halves of their observed credit score
ranges, essentially designating “plus” and “minus” borrowers within each ob-
served category. The last row of Table 4.8 reveals that the reform induced
almost no borrower selection on the unobserved measure of credit-worthiness.
There was no significant difference in the fraction of loan applicants from the
top half of their credit score before and after the reform. In both periods,
about 31% of loan applications were from the top half of their credit grade.
As Table 4.8 demonstrates, the number of high risk applicants grew over
time, as did the total percentage of funds going to high risk loans. Figure
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4.8 describes the percentage of total loan funds going to each credit grade in
the two week period before (grey) and the two week period after (black) the
change in information policy.
Figure 4.8: Fraction of Funds by Credit Grade, Before/After Policy Change
Although the total amount of funds directed towards high risk borrowers
increased over this period, the growth in high risk applicants outpaced the
increase in funds. The increase in information available to lenders decreased
the probability that high risk applicants would receive loan. Although lenders
continued to fund risky projects, they became more selective among borrow-
ers with credit grades D, E, and HR.
To evaluate the impact of the policy change on the probability of funding,
I estimate the probit model
P (ci = 1) = Φ(α0 + α
>
1 Xi + α
>
2 Zi + α
>
3 Post i × (1 +Xi + Zi) + i), (4.5)
using data on all loan applicants. The dependent variable, ci, takes a value
of one if the loan application i is fully funded. The variable Posti equals 1
if loan i was made on or after April 18, 2006 and 0 otherwise. I condition
on the information available both before and after the policy change; that is,
the coarser information set. This is denoted Xi, and includes a borrower’s
credit grade and debt to income ratio, a binary variable indicating whether
or not the borrower has posted a photograph, and information on any Pros-
per social groups to which the borrower belongs. Specifically, I include a
binary variable for group membership, as well as binary variables indicating
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membership in a group where the group leader actively reviews all loan re-
quests and membership in a group where the borrower must pay a fee to be a
member. Freedman and Jin (2009) provide more details on Prosper groups.
Additionally, controls are included for the terms of loan i, specifically the in-
terest rate and size of the loan in thousands of dollars; these are denoted Zi.
The coefficients on the interaction terms describe how the new information
changed the probability that applicants would receive a loan based on their
observable characteristics. Additionally, I include interactions between the
“post” indicator and all independent variables. In some specifications I in-
clude the measure of unobserved (by lenders) borrower quality, an indicator
that borrowers were in the top half of their observed credit grade.
Column 1 of Table 4.9 presents estimates of a model that controls for
borrower characteristics observed by lenders in both periods. I find that bor-
rowers with credit grades D, E, and HR have a difficult time attracting credit
relative to higher grades in the pre-reform period, and this disadvantage be-
comes more pronounced once lenders are given access to a wider range of
credit metrics. I find that the reform reduced the probability that high risk
applicants would receive loans by about one standard deviation. The effect
is statistically significant among applicants with credit grades D and E and
marginally significant among applicants in the HR category. I report average
marginal effects in column 2. These estimates reveal that the new informa-
tion reduced the probability that a potential borrower with a D credit grade
would receive a loan by 4.8 percentage points. Potential borrowers with E
and HR credit grades experienced a reduction in the probability they would
receive a loan by 5.4 and 6.4 percentage points respectively. The average
marginal effects are significant at the 1 percent level or better. Again, I find
no significant effects for low risk applicants with higher credit scores.
Although borrowers with unobservable higher quality were no more likely
to post after the new information became available, I find weak evidence that
lenders were more likely to choose the high quality borrowers in the post-
reform period from among the pool of applicants. Columns 4 and 5 of Table
4.9 present probit estimates of the probability that a loan request is fulfilled,
where the post-reform indicator is fully interacted with both the observable
information and unobservable “plus” category. The reform increased the
probability that a lenders funded an applicant in the top half of their credit
grade by about 0.27 standard deviations, or 1.7 percentage points, although
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the coefficient is only marginally significant.
4.5 Conclusion
While a well-developed literature in economic theory suggests that informa-
tion about loan applicants plays an important role in efficient credit alloca-
tion, few empirical studies have documented this effect. This paper is the
first to provide direct evidence for the causal effect of information provision
on loan outcomes. I find that providing more information improves lender
screening and dramatically reduces the default rate, especially among high
risk loans.
This paper uses a large, unanticipated shock to the amount of financial in-
formation about borrowers available on a peer-to-peer lending website to an-
alyze the effect of information on loan performance. Allowing lenders access
to more information reduced the probability that a high risk loan applicant
would receive funding. On average, providing additional information reduced
the default rate by about 9.9 percentage points. Most of this reduction was
due to an improvement in screening of high risk loans; default rates on these
loans declined by about 12.7 percentage points. The information shock im-
mediately increased lender returns by about 12 percentage points, although
average returns on non-defaulting loans and average interest rates remained
unchanged. It took approximately six weeks for returns to return to their
pre-reform levels. Using credit score data that was unobserved by lenders,
I do not find significant selection in the pool of loan applicants. Taken to-
gether, these results present strong evidence that better lender screening is
responsible for the reduction in default rates.
These results are robust to alternative window sizes and model specifica-
tions. Additionally, empirical simulations indicate that despite the volatility
of the Prosper market, estimated effects of this magnitude are not due to
chance. My results imply that even relatively unsophisticated investors ben-
efit from information provision and underline the importance of information
in the allocation of credit.
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Table 4.5: Dependent variable: Time from Loan Origination until
Delinquency
Using +/- Two Week All of 2006
(Intercept) 450.5436 (200.1328)** 410.3 (86.31)***
Post 112.8952 (64.5284)* 170.8 (85.15)**
CreditGrade AA 114.1151 (215.3784) 40.91 (49.46)
CreditGrade B -16.0299 (154.9152) 47.69 (38.01)
CreditGrade C 8.5520 (159.3379) 31.39 (36.46)
CreditGrade D -154.5384 (191.7939) 40.33 (37.92)
CreditGrade E -198.2532 (210.4656) -10.27 (40.59)
CreditGrade HR -110.3722 (215.1723) -50.13 (41.53)+
CreditGrade NC -130.3328 (275.2105) -11.06 (57.32)
DebtToIncomeRatio -205.0713 (293.8635) -2.347 (9.900)
Amount ($1000) -3.5890 (7.9471) 0.3305 (1.581)
Interest Rate -338.7737 (1198.9254) -40.58 (14.29)***
GroupDummy 218.4954 (91.9619)** -13.76 (17.10)
Group with Leader Review -42.8887 (77.2547) 19.18 (14.92)
Group with a Fee -129.9015 (79.8538)+ 5.635 (14.73)
Image = 1 51.5916 (66.2174) 4.058 (12.85)
Time trend No Yes
No. Obs: 108 2181
Significance Levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%, +=15%.
Bandwidths defined relative to April 18, 2006. Time trend estimated with third degree polynomial.
Only loans with bids from lenders active before April 18, 2006 included.
Data downloaded from http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010.
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Table 4.7: Effect of the Policy Change on Interest Rates and Bids per Loan
Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Dependent Variable: Number of Bids
(Intercept) 0.09 (0.01) *** 0.09 (0.01) *** 23.91 (1.77)*** 19.62 (2.88)***
Post 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.01) -0.34 (0.57) 5.34 (3.58)
CreditGrade AA -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.01)** 3.86 (2.30)* 5.86 (3.52)*
CreditGrade B 0.03 (0.01) *** 0.03 (0.01) *** -5.29 (2.08)** 1.22 (3.47)
CreditGrade C 0.06 (0.01) *** 0.06 (0.01)*** -18.60 (1.89)*** -20.23 (3.11)***
CreditGrade D 0.10 (0.01) *** 0.09 (0.01)*** -26.72 (1.80)*** -26.67 (3.05)***
CreditGrade E 0.12 (0.01) *** 0.12 (0.01)*** -30.77 (1.72)*** -32.51 (2.93)***
CreditGrade HR 0.13 (0.01) *** 0.11 (0.01)*** -33.29 (1.66)*** -37.11 (2.77)***
CreditGrade NC 0.13 (0.02) *** 0.15 (0.03)*** -30.75 (2.79)*** -34.78 (4.93)***
DebtToIncomeRatio 0.06 (0.01) *** 0.06 (0.01) *** -1.78 (0.61)*** -37.49 (1.31)**
Amount Requested 0.002 (0.0003)*** 0.002 (0.001) *** 0.0001 (0.0001)* 0.001 (0.00) ***
GroupDummy -0.01 (0.004) *** -0.01 (0.01) * 4.29 (0.87)*** 4.79 (1.62)
Group with Leader Review 0.001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.001) 3.77 (0.88)*** 3.94 (1.40)***
Group with Fee 0.007 (0.004)* 0.01 (0.01)* -3.02 (0.89)*** -3.14 (1.53)*
Image = 1 -0.01 (0.003) ** 0.001 (0.005) 2.88 (0.52)*** 4.01 (0.98)***
Interest Rate – – 50.84 (4.09)*** 82.56 (8.11)***
Post*CreditGradeAA – 0.005 (0.01) – -4.57 (4.66)
Post*CreditGradeB – -0.002 (0.01) – -10.4 (4.33)**
Post*CreditGradeC – 0.001 (0.01) – 1.96 (3.91)
Post*CreditGradeD – 0.01 (0.01) – -3.87 (3.78)
Post*CreditGradeE – 0.003 (0.01) – 2.12 (3.62)
Post*CreditGradeHR – 0.02 (0.01)* – 4.75 (3.46)
Post*CreditGradeNC – -0.03 (0.03) – 5.11 (5.98)
Post*DebtToIncomeRatio – 0.01 (0.02) – 2.45 (1.48)
Post*Amount – -0.000 (0.001) – -0.000 (0.000)**
Post*GroupDummy – 0.003 (0.01) – -0.82 (1.92)
Post*Group with LeaderReview – -0.01 (0.01) – -0.57 (1.80)
Post*Group with Fee – -0.01 (0.01) – 0.47 (1.88)
Post*Image=1 – -0.01 (0.01)** – -1.52 (1.57)
No. Obs: 339 339 339 339
Significance Levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%, +=15%. Bandwidths defined relative to April 18, 2006.
Data downloaded from http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx on Feb. 28, 2010.
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Table 4.8: Comparison of Potential Borrowers Before and After the Policy
Change
Variable Two Weeks Before Two Weeks After
Policy Change Policy Change
Fraction AA 0.04 0.01 ∗ ∗∗
Fraction A 0.03 0.02 ∗ ∗
Fraction B 0.04 0.03 ∗ ∗
Fraction C 0.08 0.05 ∗ ∗∗
Fraction D 0.09 0.08
Fraction E 0.14 0.19
Fraction HR 0.54 0.59
Fraction NC 0.02 0.02
Debt to Income Ratio 0.21 0.23∗∗
Top Half of Credit Grade 0.31 0.31
Significance Levels for Differences: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%
Data downloaded on Feb. 28, 2010 from http://www.prosper.com/tools/DataExport.aspx
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